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Abstract
Investigating various scal policy issues in the context of an open economy, this dissertation consists
of three essays.
The rst essay addresses the question of the volatility of foreign aid and its impact on resourceconstrained developing economies. A small open-economy business cycle model is developed that
accounts for the eect of external shocks specic to developing economies.

The model produces

business cycle patterns consistent with the data and key stylized facts. The model is calibrated to
reect the structural empirical regularities of an aid-dependent developing country. The parameters
of the exogenous stochastic shocks are estimated using Bayesian methods and 50 years of data for
Cote d'Ivoire. The results suggest that foreign aid's unpredictability helps explain business cycles'
volatility in developing countries.
In the second essay, a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model (DSGE) is used to analyze
the eects of scal stimuli, such as investment tax credits (ITC) and wage subsidies, in a small
open economy.

Various cost-equivalent scal schemes are considered in response to an economic

downturn. The baseline open-economy model's results are also contrasted with a closed economy
case to highlight the role the current account plays during recession and recovery episodes.

The

results suggest that wage subsidies have faster but shorter eects on production and employment
while ITCs have slower but longer lasting impacts. The persistence of scal shocks appears to play
a signicant role in the initial response of investment.
The third essay provides empirical evidence to address a question heavily debated among lawmakers
yet hardly ever investigated in the empirical literature: Does increasing taxes on the rich hurt or
help employment growth? Proponents of tax hikes on the rich reject the idea that such taxes, which
some refer to as  millionaire taxes, have any negative impact on jobs. Critics, on the other hand,
believe taxing the rich, whom they consider  job creators, hurts the economy by hampering job
creation. Using newly constructed time series based on the IRS Statistics of Income, this study nds
strong and statistically signicant positive eects in the short run and some evidence of negative
eects in the long run.
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Chapter 1

Foreign Aid Volatility and Real Business
Cycles in a Developing Open Economy
1.1

Introduction

It is widely recognized that the volatility of business cycles in developing economies is signicantly
higher than in industrialized countries.

Aggregate uctuations in output fell considerably in the

United States and other OECD countries during the post-World War II period, while the uctuations remained high for developing countries.

As Rand and Tarp (2002) show, the nature and

characteristics of business cycles in the developing world dier signicantly from developed countries. The empirical literature also documents the huge welfare and growth costs associated with
highly volatile business cycles. Pallage and Robe (2003) provide a good discussion on the welfare
cost of business cycles in developing countries (See also Gomes and do Nascimento (2004)). Two
common explanations for the excessive uctuations in developing economies are their inability to
implement eective stabilizing policies and their exposure to external shocks in a way that developed
countries do not experience.
Many developing economies, especially the most resource-constrained, are heavily dependent on
external sources of income such as foreign aid. According to The World Bank, aid represents, on

1

average, approximately 13 percent of GNI for low-income countries.

1 Empirical evidence shows that

foreign aid is extremely volatile. Using data for 63 countries from 1969 to 1995, Pallage and Robe
(2001) estimate aid ows to be twice as volatile as the output of recipient economies. Bulir and
Hamann (2003) found that aid is signicantly more volatile than scal revenues for 72 aid recipient
countries between 1975 and 1997.
Empirical studies have also documented the consequences of high volatility in aid ows. Numerous
previous works have analyzed the implications of volatile foreign aid without specically addressing
the eects on the business cycles of recipient countries (Agénor and Aizenman (2010), Arellano et al.
(2009), Hudson and Mosley (2008a,b), Lensink and Morrissey (2000) and Raddatz (2007)). Given
the substantial welfare and growth consequences associated with highly volatile business cycles,
it is important to investigate whether foreign aid exacerbates short-run aggregate uctuations in
recipient countries. This question has critical policy implications. To design eective macroeconomic
stabilization policies, it is crucial to understand the specic driving forces of short-run uctuations
in developing economies and how those economies respond to exogenous shocks. The role of foreign
aid is particularly relevant because the goal of aid is to reduce poverty and promote economic
growth. This study contributes to the literature by clarifying the implications of volatile foreign aid
for the business cycles of a developing open economy.
Conceptually, procyclical aid will add to the volatility of business cycles while countercyclical aid acts
as a stabilizing mechanism. There has been considerable debate in the literature on this cyclicality
issue, but no consensus has been reached.

Pallage and Robe (2001) nd evidence that foreign

aid is strongly procyclical for African countries, in particular, and somewhat procyclical for other
developing countries in their sample. However, Rand and Tarp (2002) nd that, when optimal lters
are applied, there is no statistically signicant evidence of procyclical aid disbursement. Instead,
they nd evidence of countercyclical aid in 10 of the 15 countries in their sample. Similarly, Chauvet
and Guillaumont (2009), using trade cycles instead of output, nd that the procyclical nature of
aid is weak.
Surprisingly, little theoretical work has been conducted with regard to aid volatility and the eect on
1

Average of Net Ocial Development Assistance (ODA) as a percentage of Gross National Income (GNI) for the

34 low income countries as classied by The World Bank.

2

the business cycles of developing countries. Most aid literature is empirical.

2 Agénor and Aizenman

(2010), Chatterjee and Turnovsky (2005) and Dalgaard (2008) are rare exceptions. However, these
studies are based on deterministic frameworks and are not suitable to study economic uctuations,
which are stochastic by nature. This essay contributes to the literature by reconciling two lines of
research: foreign aid volatility and small open-economy real business cycles (RBC).
Despite its remarkable success, the standard small open-economy RBC model performs poorly
when applied to the data of developing economies.

3 As Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) note, the

small open-economy RBC model predicts the trade balance-to-output ratio (TBY) to be positively
correlated with output and predicts consumption to be smoother than output.

However, most

low and middle-income economies are characterized by countercyclical trade balance and highly
volatile consumption. The relevant literature oers two theories to explain this poor performance.
The traditional argument is derived from institutional theories.

Supporters of this theory argue

that developing countries are characterized by a plurality of distortions and market failures that
make standard neoclassical models an inadequate framework to analyze those economies.

Some

of the distortions cited include weak institutions, widespread corruption, and low property rights
enforcement. Recent research departs from this mainstream view and asserts that an explicit account
of distortions is not necessary to obtain a good t of the RBC model with the data. Aguiar and
Gopinath (2007) show that the RBC model for a small open economy is consistent with an emerging
market economy when productivity shocks have a nonstationary component. They acknowledge the
presence of distortions but argue that those distortions can be modeled as nonstationary productivity
shocks. However, using long samples from Argentina and Mexico, García-cicco et al. (2010) nd that
the RBC model, driven by stationary and nonstationary productivity shocks, does not adequately
explain the observed business cycles. By augmenting the nonstationary shock model with preference
shocks and accounting for international nancial frictions, they nd that the augmented model does
a better job mimicking the data for Argentina.
2

Pallage and Robe (2001), one of the most cited papers on aid volatility, admit that their work may be subject to

the criticism of  measurement without theory .
3

Williamson (1996) provides reviews and discussions on the RBC approach. Mendoza (1991) extends the method

to the case of the small open economy with remarkable success.

Applied to the Canadian economy, the model

replicates many of the stylized facts typical to a small open economy.

3

In this study, a model of small open-economy business cycles is developed that successfully replicates
the data for a developing country. Unlike Aguiar and Gopinath (2007), nonstationary shocks are
not assumed a priori.

This study's approach also diers from García-cicco et al. (2010) in that

preference shocks are not assumed. To make the model consistent with the reality of developing
economies, two sources of exogenous shocks that typically aect those countries are accounted for.
Foreign aid is modeled as a stochastic transfer from abroad. This specication of foreign aid is not
new to the literature. Arellano et al. (2009) similarly treat aid inows as a stochastic foreign transfer

4 Following García-cicco et al. (2010), international

in their two-sector tradable-nontradable model.

nancial frictions in the form of stochastic interest rate premium shocks are included. Second, the
role of the public sector is introduced in the form of investment in public capital, which is nanced
by a combination of domestic tax revenue and foreign aid. It is well documented that public capital
plays a crucial role in resource-constrained developing countries (see, for example, Agénor (2010),
Devarajan et al. (1998) and Chatterjee and Turnovsky (2005)). To my knowledge, this study is the
rst to account for both foreign aid and public investment in a small open-economy business cycle
model.
The predictions of the model conrm the nding by García-cicco et al. (2010) that nonstationary
shocks do not play a signicant role in the business cycles of developing economies.

The model

produces business cycle patterns that are qualitatively consistent with the data of Cote d'Ivoire and
the key stylized facts that standard RBC models fail to capture. Specically, the excess volatility of
consumption versus output is successfully replicated. The model is calibrated to reect the structural
empirical regularities of Cote d'Ivoire, a typical foreign aid dependent developing country.

The

parameters of the exogenous stochastic shocks are estimated using Bayesian methods and 50 years
of data for Cote d'Ivoire. The results indicate that foreign aid adds signicantly to the volatility
of business cycles in aid-dependent countries. Findings also include evidence that directing more
aid resources to public investment instead of household transfers potentially reduces the volatility
4

As discussed earlier, the exogenous nature of foreign aid is still matter for debate in the empirical literature

(Pallage and Robe (2001), Rand and Tarp (2002) and Chauvet and Guillaumont (2009)). It is arguable that a single
gure for aid (aggregate aid) is not endogenous to the recipient economy. As Mavrotas and Ouattara (2006) note,
aid is heterogeneous and each of its components is dierently related to the recipient economy. For example, it makes
sense to think of emergency or relief aid as countercyclical while investment-tied aid is possibly procyclical.

4

of consumption.
The remainder of the essay is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical developing
open-economy business cycle model with foreign aid and international nancial frictions. Section 3
presents the calibration of the model and the results of the Bayesian estimations. Section 4 evaluates
how well the model performs in terms of replicating the observed business cycles and predicting the
response of the economy to exogenous shocks. Section 5 is the conclusion.

1.2

The Model

The economy features a continuum of innitely-lived identical households. The representative household maximizes its lifetime expected utility from consumption

E

∞
X

C

and leisure:

β t U (Ct , Lt )

(1.1)

t=0
where

L

stands for labor hours and

β

is a constant subjective discount factor.

As in standard small open-economy RBC models, domestic residents can borrow from the rest of
the world to smooth consumption. The stock of debt at time t, denoted
rate

Rt .

The world interest rate

R∗

Dt , is subject to the interest

is exogenously determined abroad. As a small open economy,

residents can borrow as much as they want without aecting the world interest rate. However, a
risk premium is assessed based on the aggregate level of indebtedness of the economy. The interest
rate

Rt

is given by:



∗

Rt = R + p
where

p (Dt/Yt )

is the country-specic risk premium.

Dt
Yt



The premium

p()

is a strictly increasing

function of indebtedness, as measured by the ratio of stock of foreign debt to output Dt/Yt . SchmittGrohe and Uribe (2003) showed that using a debt-elastic interest rate premium is one of many
ways to ensure stationarity in the small open-economy model with results that are consistent across

5

methods.
5

Other methods to ensure stationarity include using an Uzawa type preference (endogenous discount factor),

5

The risk-premium here does not just serve the purpose of ensuring stationarity, as in standard
models. The risk premium parameter is calibrated to reect the actual economy, as discussed in
section 3.

6

More importantly, foreign debt shocks are included, as in García-cicco et al. (2010).

Blankenau et al. (2001) show that international interest rate shocks can explain up to one-third
of the uctuations in output and more than half of the uctuations in net exports and net foreign
assets.

These shocks are not unique to developing economies.

What is unique, however, is the

magnitude of their consequences on those economies. Many of the nancial and economic crises that
hit developing countries over the last couples of decades either originated from or were aggravated
by sky-rocketing interest rate premiums (Calvo (1998) and Calvo and Mendoza (2000)). A popular
example of this is the 1994 Mexican  Tequila crisis that spread across Latin-American countries
and other unrelated emerging markets worldwide.
The country interest rate premium takes the following form:


p
where

ιt

Dt
Yt




 D
t
= ψ e Yt − 1 + ιt

represents the shock to the risk premium and is given by the following AR(1) process:

ειt ∼ N IID(0, σι2 )

ιt = ρι ιt−1 + ειt ;

(1.2)

In sum, the debt-elastic interest rate with premium shocks takes the following form:


 D
t
Y
t
Rt = R + ψ e − 1 + ιt
∗

(1.3)

Equation 1.3 shows that the premium is nil in expectation for an economy with no external debt. A
debt free economy is subject to the world rate and the random component of the potential premium.
In addition to the ability to borrow, domestic residents receive international transfers in the form
of foreign aid,

At ,

which follows the AR(1) process:

introducing portfolio adjustment costs and assuming complete asset markets. In this study, the debt-elastic interest
rate approach is used because it realistically reects the interest rate challenges facing emerging countries.
6

These innovations constitute a notable departure from the standard RBC model, as noted by García-cicco et al.

(2010).

The terms foreign debt shocks and interest rate premium shocks are used interchangeably to denote

international nancial frictions.

6

εat ∼ N IID(0, σa2 )

ln (At /A) = ρa ln (At−1 /A) + εat ;
where

A

(1.4)

is the long-run level of foreign aid. As mentioned in the introduction, whether foreign aid

is truly exogenous to the recipient economy is a question that is not settled in the literature (Agénor
and Aizenman (2010), Chauvet and Guillaumont (2009), Pallage and Robe (2001) and Rand and
Tarp (2002)). Aspects such as conditional aid, social insurance aid and aid as a reward for good
governance are, among others, candidate justications for endogenous aid processes (Paul (2006)
presents a survey on the topic). However, there is limited empirical evidence in support of the cyclical
nature of aid with respect to the recipient economy. In contrast, the high volatility of foreign aid
compared to domestic output and scal revenue is well documented (Agénor and Aizenman (2010)
present a summary). In this study, aid is modeled as an exogenous process to abstract from the
discussion on its possible cyclicality and only focus on its proven volatility. Arellano et al. (2009)
follow a similar approach and treat aid inows as a stochastic foreign transfer in their two-sector
tradable-nontradable model.
The standard stochastic production technology is augmented with public capital

t, the economy produces a single output Yt
private capital

Kt−1

using labor

Lt

available at the beginning of period

Ht .

For each period

and the stocks of public capital

t.

Ht−1

Hence:

Yt = Zt F (Ht−1 , Kt−1 , Lt )
where

Zt

and

(1.5)

is the random technology variable, following the AR(1) process:

ln Zt = ρz ln Zt−1 + εzt ;

εzt ∼ N IID(0, σz2 )

(1.6)

The stocks of private and public capital evolve according to the standard laws of motion described
in equations 1.7 and 1.8, where

It

and

Jt

are private and public investments and

depreciation rates.
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δ

and

ζ

are the

Kt = (1 − δ)Kt−1 + It

(1.7)

Ht = (1 − ζ)Ht−1 + Jt

(1.8)

The government provides public capital through a combination of tax revenue and foreign aid. The
government budget constraint is given by

τt Yt + πAt = Jt + Φ2 (Ht − Ht−1 )
where

τt

is the tax rate,

π [0, 1]

(1.9)

is the fraction of aid allocated to public investment and

convex capital adjustment cost function, with

Φ2 (0) = 0

and

Φ02 (.) > 0.

Φ2 (.)

is a

The tax rate is assumed to

be constant and exogenously set by the government:

τt = τ
The remaining portion of aid,

(1 − π),

(1.10)

enters the household's budget constraint as a transfer, as

shown in equation 1.11.

Dt = (1 + Rt−1 ) Dt−1 + Ct + It + Φ1 (Kt − Kt−1 ) − (1 − τt ) Yt − (1 − π) At
where

It

is private investment and

properties as

Φ1 (.)

(1.11)

represents private capital adjustment costs with similar

Φ2 (.).

The representative household maximizes its lifetime expected utility (1.1) subject to equations 1.2
to 1.11 and a no-Ponzi game condition of the form:

Dt+v
≤0
u=1 (1 + Ru )

lim Qv

v→∞
Let

λt

1.11).

denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with the household's budget constraint (equation
The rst-order conditions (FOCs) of this maximization problem are equations 1.2 to 1.11
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holding with equality, and

UC (Ct , Lt ) = λt

(1.12)

UL (Ct , Lt ) = −λt (1 − τt ) Zt FL (Ht−1 , Kt−1 , Lt )

(1.13)

λt = β(1 + Rt )Et λt+1

(1.14)





λt 1 + Φ01 (Kt − Kt−1 ) = βEt λt+1 (1 − δ) + Et Φ01 (Kt+1 − Kt ) + (1 − τt ) Zt+1 FK (Ht−1 , Kt−1 , Lt )
(1.15)
The FOCs 1.12 to 1.15 are standard. Combining equations 1.12 and 1.13 yields the labor market
equilibrium condition, which implies that real wages must equal the eective marginal product of
labor (MPL):

−

UL
= (1 − τt ) Zt FL (Ht−1 , Kt−1 , Lt )
Uc

Equations 1.14 and 1.15 are Euler equations, similar to those found in standard small open-economy
RBC models. However, they now embed the interest rate premium shocks

ιt

and serve as a trans-

mission mechanism to propagate those shocks into the economy.
A dynamic competitive equilibrium is characterized by a set of processes,

{Dt , Rt , Kt+1 , Ht+1 , Ct , Lt , Yt , It , Jt , λt , τt , Zt , At , ιt }, which satises equations 1.2 to 1.15, the initial
conditions and the no-Ponzi game constraint. As a non-linear stochastic model, there is no analytical
solution for the transitional dynamics.
state.

The model is log-linearized around its unique stationary

Numerical simulations are used to approximate the law of motion of each variable in the

vicinity of the steady state given the state of economy,
stochastic processes

{Zt , At , ιt }.
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{Dt−1 , Kt−1 , Ht−1 , Rt−1 } and the exogenous

1.3

Calibration and Estimation Methods

This study uses functional forms that are common in small open-economy RBC models and relies
on a combination of calibration and Bayesian estimation to determine the values of the parameters.
Preferences are represented by a GHH-type utility function following Greenwood et al. (1988):

C − θω −1 Lω
U (C, L) =
1−γ
where

γ

is the coecient of relative risk aversion and

θ

1−γ

and

ω

−1

are the parameters for the intertem-

poral elasticity of substitution in labor supply.
The cost functions take the following forms:

Φj (x) = 1/2φj x2

with

φj > 0

and

j = 1, 2.

The study assumes a Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns to scale in public
capital, private capital and labor:

F (H, K, L) = H κ K α L1−α−κ

where

α, κ > 0

and

α + κ < 1.

The goal of the calibration exercise is to set the deep parameters such that the steady state
generated by the model is roughly consistent with the structural empirical facts of the developing
economy being studied.
This studies identies developing countries that are foreign aid-dependent and for which long
macroeconomic time series are available. Cote d'Ivoire is one of the few candidate countries that

7 The time series considered are annual observations from 1960 to 2010. The

satised both criteria.

data are from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI) database.

Appendix A1

provides further details on the observed series used. Figure 1.1 shows the volatility of foreign aid
7

Cote d'Ivoire is a former French colony in West Africa on the Gulf of Guinea. Unlike many neighboring countries,

it has experienced a long period of political stability following its independence from France in 1960. Cote d'Ivoire
is chosen for a few reasons: (1) about 50 years of time series are available for the variables of interest; (2) there
are several previous studies on Cote d'Ivoire in the foreign aid literature (e.g., Mavrotas and Ouattara (2006) and
Arellano et al. (2009)) and (3) the Ivorian business cycle pattern is fairly similar to Argentina's (with a severe output
collapse in the 1980s), and Argentina has been extensively studied in emerging economy RBC papers, providing
reference results (Kydland and Zarazaga (2002), Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) and García-cicco et al. (2010)).
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compared to output for the past 50 years.

Comparing the standard deviations over the period,

foreign aid is almost four times more volatile than output.

(a) Panel A

(b) Panel B (Scaled)

Figure 1.1: Volatility of Aid and Output in Cote d'Ivoire
Notes : All series are HP-ltered with the parameter lambda equal 6.25.

Figure 1.2 illustrates the domestic output trend for this timeframe.

Cote d'Ivoire experienced

two decades of successful economic growth following its independence in 1960.
this timeframe, the country also incurred high foreign debt.

However, during

The drop in commodity prices in

the early 1980s combined with the second energy crisis in the late 1970s sent the country into a
severe economic depression that lasted more than a decade. The Ivorian economy showed signs of
a promising recovery during the 1990s but then experienced another severe economic downturn due
to political troubles in 1999 and the beginning of a civil war in 2002.
The period from 1960 to 1980 is assumed to be representative of the long-run balanced growth path
to calibrate the model. Kydland and Zarazaga (2002) adopted a similar approach for their calibration, using data for Argentina. The parameter values from the calibration exercise are summarized
in Table 1.1. The value of the parameter

ψ

is set to mimic the average trade balance-to-output ratio

of Cote d'Ivoire during this period. On average, the trade balance is positive and approximately
6 percent of GDP. The parameter

%

corresponds to the Ivorian public investment share of GDP,

which is approximately 12 percent. The private and public capital depreciation rates

δ

and

ζ

are

set to 7 percent and 5 percent, respectively, yielding a private investment share of approximately
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Figure 1.2: Output and its Trend in Cote d'Ivoire from 1960 to 2010
Notes : Trend obtained using an HP lter with lambda=6.25.

11 percent of GDP, which is roughly in line with the average value observed in Cote d'Ivoire. The
parameters for the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in labor supply

ω

and

θ

are set such that

in the steady state households allocate 36 percent of their time to labor.
This study faces the same diculty as previous studies in regard to assigning values to factor income
shares, as there is no reliable data for developing countries.
literature are adopted;
for

π,

α

and

κ

Commonly used values in related

are set at 0.3 and 0.12, respectively. There is also no reliable data

which is set low enough to account for the fact that only a small portion of aid is eectively

spent on productive investment. Government expenditure on services and goods, other than capital
goods, is treated as a simple transfer to the household. Finally, the discount factor

β

is set such

that the annual real interest rate is approximately 11 percent in the steady state. Assuming that
the world interest rate is 4 percent, the implied country risk premium is approximately 7 percent,
which is high but realistic for a developing country. García-cicco et al. (2010) set the discount factor
for Argentina such that the average annual interest rate is 8.5 percent.
Table 1.1: Calibration

α

β

δ

κ

π

ψ

θ

%

ω

ζ

0.3

0.9

0.07

0.12

0.1

0.05

1.6

0.12

1.75

0.05

The parameters of the exogenous stochastic processes that propagate shocks in the economy using
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are estimated using Bayesian methods and observed Ivorian data.
cients

ρz , ρa ,

and

ρι

and the standard deviations

σz , σa ,

and

σι

8 Specically, the AR(1) coe-

are estimated. The time series data

used include domestic output, foreign aid, and trade balance-to-output ratio from 1960 to 2010.
The priors on the AR(1) coecients are drawn from beta distributions with a 95 percent probability
interval that ranges from 0.46 to 0.95. The priors on the standard deviations of the exogenous shocks
are drawn from inverse-gamma distributions such that the 95 percent probability intervals have a
lower bound near zero and a large upper bound. For more details on the priors, see appendix A2.

1.4

Results and Discussion

1.4.1 Estimation results
9 The results show

Table 1.2 summarizes the posterior distributions of the estimated parameters.

that the exogenous processes are persistent. Foreign aid shocks are slightly more persistent than
productivity shocks, with a mean half-life of approximately 6 years versus 5 years for productivity
shocks. Interest rate premium shocks are extremely persistent, with an estimated coecient that
suggests a process close to a random walk. The estimated standard deviation of foreign aid shocks
is almost ve times larger than that of productivity shocks and about three times larger than that of
foreign debt shocks. The estimates suggest that the model attributes a signicant share of business
cycle uctuations to foreign aid shocks.

This result is conrmed by the variance decomposition

exercise shown in Table 1.3. Foreign aid shocks have the highest impact on the volatility of consumption and public investment. As expected, foreign debt shocks have the highest impact on the
volatility of private investment and trade balance. Positive premium shocks force the economy to
cut back on decits. Given the preference for consumption smoothing, decit cuts severely aect
investment.
8
9

Estimations were carried out using the software Dynare version 4.2 (Grioli (2011), Adjemian et al. (2011).)
See Appendix A3 for plots of the probability density functions (PDF) of the posteriors
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Table 1.2: Estimation Results: Posterior distributions
Half-life
Parameter

Mean

95% Conf. Interval

(Mean)

ρz
ρa
ρι
σz
σa
σι

0.88

0.80

0.96

0.89

0.86

0.92

6

0.99

0.99

0.99

69

0.15

0.12

0.18

0.72

0.59

0.85

0.24

0.20

0.29

5

Notes: Estimations are based on ve independent runs of Markov Chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) Metropolis-Hasting simulations with 100,000 draws
each, from which the rst halves were discarded. Plots of the posteriors distributions are shown in Appendix A3. Brooks and Gelman 1989 statistics are
shown in Appendix A4. The half-life estimates are computed as ln 0.5/ ln ρx
where x = z, a, ι.

Table 1.3: Variance Decomposition
Productivity

Foreign aid

Interest rate

Variable

shock

shock

premium shock

Output

43.76

49.15

7.09

Consumption

9.43

88.28

2.3
25.15

Investment

23.79

51.06

Public Investment

11.35

86.81

1.84

Trade balance-to-output

5.91

84.17

9.92

1.4.2 Business cycles properties
As discussed in the introduction, one of the key shortcomings of the standard small open-economy
RBC model is its inability to properly replicate the autocorrelation of the trade balance-to-output
ratio when applied to developing economies. The standard RBC models and the models with nonstationary shocks theorized by Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) predict a coecient of autocorrelation
that is close to unity and at over time. This suggests that the TBY ratio follows a process close
to a random walk. In the observed data, however, it is clear that the autocorrelation coecient is
less than one for the rst order and quickly declines to zero by the fourth lag. For example, for
Cote d'Ivoire, the actual rst order autocorrelation is 0.67. the model generates predictions that
are fairly close to the data, both in terms of magnitude and trend (see Figure 1.3).
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Figure 1.3: Autocorrelation Function of the Trade Balance-to-Output Ratio
Notes :

Just as in the data, the model predicts an autocorrelation coecient close to 0.6 at the rst order.

The

coecient then declines quickly to zero by the fourth lag. Observations are annual.
* The predicted function for the standard small open economy RBC are borrowed from García-cicco et al. (2010)

One of the main reasons this study's model replicates the behavior of this ratio so well is that it
accounts for realistic foreign debt interest rate premiums. In the standard model, the TBY ratio
inherits most of its behavior from the near random walk consumption process because of the household preference for smooth consumption. In a model with realistic premiums, the household can
still borrow from abroad to smooth consumption, but it must take into account the consequences
associated with running consistently high decits. Trade decits translate into foreign debt accumulation, which increases interest rate premiums and forces the economy to cut back on the decit.
This issue is further discussed in the second half of this section as the eects of interest rate premium
shocks are analyzed.
Perhaps the most critical test for any RBC model is whether it replicates the empirical second
moments of the main aggregate variables of the economy. One of the key stylized facts of developing
economies' business cycles is that consumption is substantially more volatile than output. Table
1.4 (Panel A) shows the relative standard deviations of consumption and investment with respect
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to output. The model accurately predicts that both consumption and investment are more volatile
than output; however, the volatility of investment is not as high as in the data.
Table 1.4: Data Versus Model Second moments
(a) Standard Deviations (Relative to Output)

Data*

Model

Output

1

1

Consumption

1.13

Investment

3.4

(b) Correlation with Output

Data*

Model

TBY ratio

-0.05

-0.02

1.21

Consumption

0.67

0.64

1.24

Investment

0.14

0.16

* The empirical second moments are calculated from Ivorian data for the period from 1960 to 2010.
Panel B of Table 1.4 shows the correlation with output. All of the correlation results are consistent
with the general stylized facts and the data for the Ivorian economy. The model correctly predicts
both consumption and investment to be procyclical, with theoretical correlation coecients of 0.63
and 0.09, respectively, compared to the coecients of 0.67 and 0.14 in the data. The negative sign
of the model correlation of the TBY ratio suggests a countercyclical behavior, as does the data.
To get an idea of the importance of the two foreign shocks for the results, the following test is
conducted. The foreign aid and foreign debt shocks are alternately (then simultaneously) removed,
and the results are compared to the full model. The structural parameters and steady state are kept
identical for all four models. Table 1.5 summarizes the results. In terms of volatility (Panel A), the
reduced model with only productivity shocks has the worst results. It predicts both consumption and
investment to be less volatile than output. The model with foreign aid and productivity shocks has
the closest result to the full model. In terms of correlation with output, the model without foreign aid
shocks fails to replicate the countercyclical behavior of the trade balance-to-output ratio. Overall,
the full model has the best performance, followed by the model with productivity and foreign aid
shocks. These results provide further evidence that volatile foreign aid and international nancial
frictions add to the volatility of business cycles in low-income countries.

1.4.3 Response to stochastic shocks
This subsection analyzes the response of the economy to stochastic shocks as predicted by the model.
Figure 1.4 shows the responses to a productivity shock. As expected, a positive productivity shock
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Table 1.5: Reduced Models Versus Full Model and Data
(a) Standard Deviations (Relative to Output)

Model

Data

Productivity
Full model

Productivity

and debt

Productivity

and aid shocks

shocks

only

Output

1

1

1

1

1

Consumption

1.13

1.21

1.23

0.58

0.57

Investment

3.4

1.24

1.16

1.08

0.84

(b) Correlation with Output

Model

Data
Full model

Productivity
and aid shocks

Productivity
and debt
shocks

Productivity
only

TBY ratio

-0.05

-0.02

-0.04

0.05

-0.06

Consumption

0.67

0.64

0.63

0.96

0.99

Investment

0.14

0.16

0.2

0.3

0.51

leads to an increase in output, consumption, labor and both types of investment in the current
period. Because the shock is persistent, agents expect higher income for multiple periods ahead.

10

They borrow against their future income to smooth consumption, which causes the trade balance to
depreciate signicantly in the current period. To this point, the story is similar to the predictions of
the standard small open-economy RBC model, and it is consistent with the countercyclical nature
of the trade balance-to-output ratio. However, unlike the standard model, agents face an upward
sloping supply of foreign debt. Increased trade decits translate to an increased foreign debt level,
which, in turn, causes the interest rate to spike. Agents react by adjusting their expenditure level
to cut back on the decit and increase saving for a couple of periods after the shock, as illustrated
by the trade balance-to-output ratio impulse response function (Figure 1.4, Bottom-Center panel).
The savings (or lower decit) eect, combined with the increased level of output, improve the
creditworthiness of the economy, as measured by its debt-output ratio, thus yielding lower interest
rates going forward (Figure 1.4, Middle-Left panel). This reaction of the trade-balance eectively
illustrates the mechanism through which the model is able to accurately replicate the autocorrelation
10

Recall the results from the Bayesian estimation in Section 3. The half-life is estimated to be 5 periods.
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function of the TBY ratio. Conversely, standard models predict a at and near random walk process,
as discussed above.

Figure 1.4: Response to Productivity Shock
Notes : The dierent panels show the impulse response functions following one positive standard deviation productivity

shock. All responses are deviations from steady state values and are normalized as percentage of the initial shock.
The horizontal axes are number of periods after the shock.

Figure 1.5 shows responses to a foreign aid shock. The initial responses are similar to what the model
predicts for the productivity shock: output, consumption, labor and both types investments are all
positively aected in the current period. Because foreign aid is persistent, the household borrows
against its expected higher future income to smooth consumption.
deteriorates as a result (Figure 1.5, Bottom-Center panel).

The trade balance naturally

However, unlike with productivity

shocks, the deterioration of the trade balance here does not necessarily translate into net foreign
debt accumulation.

As a transfer from abroad, foreign aid has a positive impact on the current
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account and helps lower the debt level and, consequently, the interest rate premium (Figure 1.5,

11

Middle-Right and Bottom-Right panels).

Figure 1.5: Response to Aid Shock
Notes : The dierent panels show the impulse response functions following one positive standard deviation productivity

shock. All responses are deviations from steady state values and are normalized as percentage of the initial shock.
The horizontal axes are number of periods after the shock.

Figure 1.6 shows how the economy reacts to an unexpected interest rate premium spike. As expected,
output, labor, consumption and investments fall. More notably, the model accurately predicts some
of the typical empirical regularities of a  sudden stop phenomenon, as dened by Calvo (1998).
11

12

Here, the increase in foreign aid osets the eects of the trade balance decit, as in the national account identity:

∆N F A = CA = T B + N T ,

where the acronyms stand for Net foreign asset, Current account, Trade balance, and

Net transfer, in that order.
12

The term sudden stop was coined by Calvo (1998) to characterize a set of stylized facts associated with nancial

crises in emerging markets. The key factor for sudden stops is the large reversal of the current account decit as
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The skyrocketing risk premium (Figure 1.6, Middle-Right panel) translates into an abrupt loss of
access to international capital markets, forcing the economy to save. The result is a sharp and large
reversal of the current account decit as illustrated by the impulse response functions of the current
account, trade balance, and external debt (Figure 1.6, bottom panels). At the same time, output
and investment collapse as is typical during sudden stop episodes (Calvo (1998)).

Figure 1.6: Response to Interest Rate Premium Shock
Notes : The dierent panels show the impulse response functions following one positive standard deviation productivity

shock. All responses are deviations from steady state values and are normalized as percentage of the initial shock.
The horizontal axes are number of periods after the shock.

the country loses its ability to borrow internationally.

20

1.4.4 Implications of aid allocation
Departing from the calibrated economy, this subsection investigates how business cycles are impacted when more aid resources are assigned to public investment instead of household transfers.
Dierent values are assigned to the parameter

π,

which is the share of aid assigned to public invest-

ment. The total level of foreign aid remains unchanged, and all other parameters hold their original
values. Table 1.6 shows that the volatility of consumption is signicantly reduced when more aid is
assigned to public investment. The standard deviation of output barely changes when the allocation
of aid resources is changed. Even when most of the aid resources go to public investment (e.g., when

π = 0.9), the volatility of output remains close to its baseline value.

As expected, public investment

becomes more volatile.
Table 1.6: Standard Deviations (Using Dierent Aid Allocations)
pi=0.1 (baseline)

pi=0.5

pi=0.9

Output

0.43

0.42

0.40

Consumption

0.52

0.36

0.24

Private investment

0.46

0.39

0.36

Public Investment

0.10

0.46

0.82

Similarly, Figure 1.7 shows that the response of consumption to a stochastic foreign aid shock is
signicantly less pronounced when more aid is directed to public investment.

In the case where

most of the foreign aid resources go to public investment, a positive shock to foreign aid causes
consumption to increase by less than 20 percent of the standard deviation of foreign aid at the
peak.

This is compared to a peak response of over 40 percent in the baseline case where most

aid is transferred to households. The response of private investment also follows the same pattern.
When

π

is increased, output responds only slightly less. As expected, public investment responds

sharply to any shock to foreign aid. Also noteworthy is the reaction of the current account (and
consequently debt), which switches from positive to negative impact as more aid is directed to public
investment. The reason for this is that the trade balance decit is even higher due to the sharp
increase in public investment. The additional external resources in the form of foreign aid do not
completely oset the deterioration of the trade balance decit as in the baseline case. As a result,
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more debt is accumulated, and the interest rate premium fails to fall, as described above.

Figure 1.7: Response to Aid Shock Under Dierent Aid Allocation Scenarios
Notes : The dierent panels show the impulse response functions following one positive standard deviation shock to

foreign aid, under dierent assumptions for the share of aid (pi) allocated to public investment. All responses are
deviations from steady state values and are normalized as percentage of the initial shock. The horizontal axes are
number of periods after the shock.

In terms of policy implications, these results suggest that directing more aid towards public investment could signicantly reduce the welfare cost associated with volatile consumption.

This

approach also aligns with the bigger goal of development aid, i.e., helping recipient countries grow
their economy and ultimately become less dependent on foreign assistance. Naturally, certain types
of aid, such as emergency relief, cannot be included in this discussion because of their temporary
nature. Volatile aid could also pose a dierent set of problems when primarily directed to public
investment. Potential issues include half-complete projects and failure to properly maintain existing
22

infrastructures. That said, the welfare improvement from more stable consumption and the longterm goal of building an independent and growing economy are compelling arguments to allocate a
larger share of foreign aid towards public investment.

1.5

Conclusions

A model of small open-economy business cycles is built with features that reect developing economies.
Foreign aid is accounted for as an exogenous source of income. The model successfully replicates
the key stylized facts of developing economy business cycles. Specically, consumption is predicted
to be more volatile than output. Furthermore, unlike standard small open-economy RBC models,
this study's model accurately replicates the autocorrelation function of the trade balance-to-output
ratio as observed in the data.

The results are in line with the ndings by García-cicco et al.

(2010) that nonstationary shocks do not play a signicant role in the business cycles of developing
economies. The model is calibrated and the parameters of the stochastic shocks are estimated using
Bayesian methods and 50 years of data for Cote d'Ivoire. The results suggest that foreign aid plays
a signicant role in the volatility of business cycles in resource-constrained developing countries.
Additionally, directing more aid resources toward public investment as opposed to transferring it
to households can reduce the volatility of consumption.

More generally, this study's results im-

ply that more attention needs to be given to international capital ows when analyzing aggregate
uctuations in those types of economies.
Although the focus of this study is foreign aid, other sources of foreign capital, such as remittances,
could be modeled similarly under the same framework. Acosta et al. (2009), for example, show that
an increase in remittance ow has signicant macroeconomic eects in emerging economies (See also
Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009)). Finally, the model presented in this essay is intended as a general
framework that can be used to analyze various policy issues in developing economies. In addition
to scal policy, possible extensions include the two-sector tradable versus nontradable version to
analyze trade policy. Such an extension will also help address issues related to the volatility of the
terms-of-trade and the consequences associated with large world price swings.
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Chapter 2

The Macroeconomic Eects of
Investment Tax Credits, Capital Income
Tax Cuts and Wage Subsidies in Open
Economies
2.1

Introduction

Among other things, two important lessons learned from the recent global nancial crises are that
economies are more than ever nancially integrated with the rest of the world and scal policies can
play a signicant role in stabilization policies, especially when monetary policies are constrained
by the zero lower bound.

1 In a world with almost perfect capital mobility, the domestic economy

is no longer fully constrained by its own resources.

In this context, understanding the dynamic

eects of scal policy changes is crucial for both emerging and developed economies. These policies
are widely used around the world either to sustain economic growth or to improve ongoing scal
imbalances. However, during economic downturns, the main goal is often to stabilize the economy
1

A situation where traditional monetary policy instruments are ineective due to short-term nominal interest rates

being near zero.
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by increasing employment, investment, and domestic output.
This essay's objective is to examine and compare the dynamic eects of alternative scal policies in
the specic context of a small open economy facing a recession. The essay focuses on three policies
in particular: investment tax credits, capital income tax cuts and wage subsidies. Although their
end goal is similar, the transmission channels dier. With an ITC in place, a government reimburses
a fraction of a rm's spending on new capital goods.

Reimbursement takes the form of a credit

deductible from the rm's overall tax bill. ITCs and capital income tax cuts are direct incentives
to invest because they either reduce the cost of capital or improve its return.

Higher capital in

turn increases the marginal product of labor, hence higher labor demand and higher wages. In the
end, the economy produces more output. Similarly, a wage subsidy is a direct incentive to hire.

2

It reduces the eective labor cost and induces the prot maximizing rm to increase employment.
Higher labor in turn increases the marginal product of capital and the economy experiences higher
capital accumulation and generates more output.
From the policymaker's perspective, it can be challenging to identify the appropriate scal response
to a an economic downturn. All the benets and costs associated with each policy must be accounted
for in order to compare them and to formulate better policy prescriptions for scal authorities. In
addition, the dynamic eects of the policy change on government revenue must be accounted for
such that comparisons only involve policies with have equivalent costs. This essay addresses this
concern.
Despite their recurrence in formulating scal stimulus policy in recent history, few theoretical attempts have been made to analyze and contrast their eects on the economy. In a Congressional
Research Service report, Hungerford and Gravelle (2010) analyze recent scal proposals to use business tax incentives for spurring economic activity. They deplore the lack of studies estimating the
impact of investment incentives on employment. Heijdra (2007) also notes that the analysis of scal
policy in open-economy models has received little attention compared with monetary policy.
Much of the scarce literature on business scal incentives uses either a closed economy framework or
2

Wage subsidies can take many forms. They can be incremental - meaning they only aect new-hiring - or non-

incremental. They can target specic groups of workers or be available for all. They can come in the form of a payroll
tax break or a government subsidy of specic hiring-related expenses like health insurance.
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a deterministic model (e.g. Assibey-Yeboah and Mohsin (2011), Brock and Turnovsky (1981), Broer
and Heijdra (2001), Fehr (1996), Gomme (2002), Gordon (1986)), Judd (1987), Karayalcin (1995),
and Turnovsky (1982).) Given the increased capital mobility in modern economies, the impacts of
investment incentives derived in closed economy models are unlikely to apply to most economies
today. Also, investment and employment incentives are often part of a larger eort to stimulate the

3 As such,

economy during or after a recession and they tend to be temporary and unpredictable.

using a deterministic framework to analyze their eects is problematic given that business cycles
are stochastic by nature.
None of the aforementioned studies consider the more realistic combination of open economy and
real business cycles. This study attempts to ll that gap. A dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
model (DSGE) is used to analyze and contrast the eects of investment and employment incentives
in a small open economy.

Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) provide a detailed presentation of

the small open-economy real business cycle framework. This study considers various policy rules
and works out the economy's transitional dynamics for each case. Included are short-lived versus
highly persistent shocks for each of the scal policies under consideration. Also, to highlight the
importance of international capital ows in how the economy responds to various stimuli, the results
of the baseline open economy model are contrasted with those of a closed economy version.
To the best of our knowledge, this study is the rst to use a stochastic open-economy framework
to contrast the eects of investment and employment scal incentives.

This study also departs

from the standard way scal shocks and transitional dynamics are analyzed.

In most studies,

impulse response functions are used to show the economy's reaction and the transitional path
following a scal shock occurring while the economy is in the steady state. However, investment
and employment incentives often come as a response to a previous shock (i.e., recession) from which
the economy is still suering or recovering. Furthermore, recent works in the public policy literature
3

In the U.S., an ITC of 7 percent on equipment purchases was introduced in 1962, suspended in 1966, restored in

1968, and repealed in 1969. The ITC was again reintroduced in 1976 and revoked in 1986 by Reagan's tax reform act.
The New Jobs Tax Credit (NJTC) of 1977 was introduced to promote employment after the 1973-1975 recession. It
was in eect through 1978. More recent examples of employment stimuli include the Bush tax cuts of 2001 and 2003
as well as the extension of the Bush payroll tax cut in the Tax Relief Unemployment Insurance and Job Creation Act
of 2010. Also, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) passed in 2009 to boost the economy in the
wake of the 2008-2009 recession featured a number of tax incentives for businesses.
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have brought attention to the fact that scal multipliers may depend on economic conditions (e.g.
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012), Karras (2014), Owyang et al. (2013), Ramey and Zubairy
(2014), and Sims and Wol (2013).) Therefore, alternatives scenarios are considered in which the
scal shock occurs, not in the steady state, but following an adverse productivity shock.
The results suggest that wage subsidies have faster but shorter eects on production and employment
while ITCs have slower but longer lasting impacts. Thus, the goals and timing of scal responses to
a recession are critical. The positive initial response of investment to an ITC increase or a capital
income tax break is much stronger in an open economy than in a closed economy. Consumption
behaves dierently.

In a closed economy, consumption tends to fall when an investment scal

incentive is provided. In contrast, all three scal incentives boost consumption in an open economy.
This study also nds that all three scal policies positively aect government revenue through their
dynamic impacts on labor and capital income taxation. However, consistently with the nding by
Judd (1987), only ITC policies are self-nancing (revenue multiplier greater than one.) Finally, the
persistence of scal shocks appears to play a signicant role in the initial response of investment.
The initial response of investment to an ITC shock is stronger when the shock is weakly persistent
(invest-while-it-lasts eect.) In contrast, the initial response of investment to a wage subsidy shock
is stronger when the shock is highly persistent (invest-if-it-will-last eect.)
The rest of the essay is organized as follows.
2, and the model's calibration in section 3.

The theoretical framework is presented in section

Section 4 discusses the results, and section 5 is the

conclusion.

2.2

The Model

This section constructs a DSGE model of a small open economy to accommodate various scal
instruments. This model serves as a baseline, which is modied later to obtain a closed-economy
counterpart.

The economy features an innitely-lived representative household, a representative

rm, and a government that conducts scal policies.

(1 − Lt )

The household derives utility from leisure

and the consumption of the single non-durable good the rm produces.
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The household

maximizes the present value of her lifetime utility:

max E

∞
X

β t U (Ct , Lt )

(2.1)

t=0
where

Ct

income

Kt

is aggregate consumption and

Wt Lt

and income from capital

Lt

is aggregate labor supply. The household receives labor

St Kt ,

where

Wt

is wage rate,

St

is rental rate of capital, and

is aggregate capital. She may also borrow from the rest of the world. The eective borrowing

rate (interest rate)
premium

p.

rt

has two components: the world interest rate

r∗

and a country-specic risk

In a small open economy, agents take the world interest rate as exogenously given. The

risk premium depends on the economy's aggregate debt level

D̃t .

Hence,

 
rt = r∗ + p D̃t

The function

p(.)

household's debt

(2.2)

is assumed to be strictly increasing. Since this is a representative economy, the

Dt

is identical to the economy's aggregate debt level

The household is subject to various government taxes.

D̃t .

The government collects taxes on both

factors of production and redistributes the proceeds to the household in the form of a lump-sum
transfer

Tt

and, when applicable, an investment tax credit

tax credit and

It

is investment. Denoting

τL

µt I t ,

where

µt

is the rate of investment

the tax rate on labor income and

τK

the tax rate on

capital income, the overall budget constraint for the household is given by:

Dt = (1 + rt−1 ) Dt−1 +Ct +(1 − µt ) It +Φ (Kt − Kt−1 )−(1 − τLt ) Wt Lt −(1 − τKt ) St Kt−1 −Tt

where

Φ(.)

is a convex capital adjustment cost function.

assumed. With the rate of depreciation

δ,

For convenience,

(2.3)

Φ(0) = Φ0 (0) = 0

is

the stock of capital evolves according to the process:

Kt = (1 − δ) Kt−1 + It

(2.4)

The household's objective is to maximize (2.1) subject to the constraints in equations 2.21 and 2.4,
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and to the following no-Ponzi game constraint:

lim Et

j→∞

!

Dt+j
Qj

s=1 (1

+ rs )

≤0

(2.5)

The following optimal conditions are obtained from the household maximization problem:

UC (Ct , Lt ) = λt

(2.6)

UL (Ct , Lt ) = −λt (1 − τLt ) Wt

(2.7)

λt = β(1 + rt )Et λt+1

(2.8)





λt (1 − µt ) + Φ0 (Kt − Kt−1 ) = βEt λt+1 (1 − µt+1 ) (1 − δ) + Φ0 (Kt+1 − Kt ) + (1 − τKt+1 ) St+1
(2.9)
where

λt

wealth.

is the Lagrange multiplier associated with her budget constraint or the shadow price of
These optimal conditions have standard interpretations in terms of marginal costs and

benets. Precisely, the rst two conditions dictate the optimal demand for consumption and the
optimal labor supply of the household while the last two capture the optimal nancial decisions
involving borrowing (foreign loans) and investing in domestic capital.
Output is produced by the representative rm according to the following standard neoclassical
production function in which the stochastic productivity shocks are represented by

Yt = Zt F (Kt−1 , Lt )

Zt .

(2.10)

Total factor productivity follows the following AR(1) process:

ln Zt = ρZ ln Zt−1 + εZt ;

εZt ∼ N IID(0, σZ2 )

(2.11)

The optimal demands for labor and capital are determined by their respective marginal products
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and real costs. Hence, the following two optimality conditions must hold:

Wt = Zt FL (Kt−1 , Lt )

(2.12)

St = Zt FK (Kt−1 , Lt )

(2.13)

The government has a balanced-budget constraint for each period, given by:

Tt + µt It = τLt Wt Lt + τKt St Kt−1

(2.14)

When no business scal incentive is in place, all of the tax revenue is redistributed to the household in
the form of lump-sum transfers

Tt .

to nance its active scal policies.

Alternatively, the government uses part of the revenue collected
Specically, the government has three general instruments to

conduct active scal policy: investment tax credits, wage subsidies, and capital income tax cuts.
The payroll tax rate

ηLt .

τLt

has a core component

Similarly, the tax rate on capital income

a tax cut component

τ̄L , which is constant, and a wage subsidy component
τKt

has a core component

τ̄K ,

which is constant, and

ηKt .4
τLt = τ̄L − ηLt

(2.15)

τKt = τ̄K − ηKt

(2.16)

To make policy rules exible in the model, a broad functional form is assumed for the three scal

µ̄

is the

µ̄ = 0,

which

incentives. Investment tax credit follows the AR(1) process given by equation 2.17, where
long-run average rate and

εµt

captures stochastic shocks to the ITC rate. By default,

means the government does not provide investment tax credits during normal times (i.e. in steady
4

In this setup, the wage subsidy is eectively a payroll tax cut. In addition, no distinction is made between the

employer and worker portion of the payroll tax. For example, a wage subsidy of 2 percent simply reduces the total
payroll tax rate by 2 percentage points. This is similar to the payroll tax treatment of self-employed taxpayers in the
U.S..
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state). A change in

µ̄

is a permanent shock, while a change in

µt = (1 − ρµ ) µ̄ + ρµ µt−1 + εµt ;

εµt

is a temporary shock.

5

εµt ∼ N IID(0, σµ2 )

(2.17)

Similarly,

ηLt = (1 − ρL ) η̄L + ρL ηLt−1 + εLt ;
ηKt = (1 − ρK ) η̄K + ρK ηKt−1 + εKt ;
In this setup, a wage subsidy policy is given by:
shock, and a change in

L

εLt ∼ N IID(0, σL2 )

(2.18)

2
εKt ∼ N IID(0, σK
)

(η̄L , L ), where a change in η̄L

(2.19)

captures a permanent

is due to an unanticipated temporary shock. Similarly, the investment

tax credit policy is given by

(µ̄, µ )

and the capital income tax break policy is given by:

(η̄K , K ).

Though this setup is very general, the essay focuses exclusively on the temporary policy changes.
Of particular interest to open economies are the trade balance and current account balances. Trade
balance

T Bt

equals income minus total domestic spending, including consumption expenditure,

investment, and capital adjustment costs:

T Bt = Yt − Ct − It − Φ (Kt − Kt−1 )

The current account balance

−(Dt −Dt−1 ).

CAt

(2.20)

captures the change in the foreign debt position of the economy:

The absolute levels of these two variables convey little meaningful information. Thus,

the focus is on their ratios to output (i.e. trade balance-to-output ratio
account balance-to-output ratio

The Closed Economy

CAYt =

T BYt =

T Bt
Yt and current

CAt
Yt .)

Since one of this study's objectives is to compare the eects of various

scal policies in an open economy with those in a closed economy, the model economy should produce
closed economy results under certain conditions. Under nancial autarky, there is no international
ow of goods and services across countries. Households and rms are completely constrained by
national resources.
5

For simplicity, the domestic government is assumed to maintain a balanced

For the ITC to be an eective incentive to invest, the implicit assumption is made that tax credits are refundable.

Non-refundable credits are not an eective incentive when the rm's total tax bill is less than the credits it is owed.
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budget all the time and there is no outstanding government debt.

The household's disposable

income is either consumed or invested. The representative household's budget constraint is thus:

Ct + (1 − µt ) It + Φ (Kt − Kt−1 ) = (1 − τLt ) Wt Lt + (1 − τKt ) St Kt−1 + Tt .

(2.21)

The closed-economy model is implemented as a special case of the open-economy model in which the
trade balance and foreign debt are constrained to be zero in each period. The optimization problem
remains the same except equation (2.3) is replaced with equation (2.21). It should be noted that
in the closed economy the real interest rate is determined by the domestic nancial market through
the eective marginal product of capital.

2.3

Parametrization and Calibration

For this study, commonly used functional forms in the RBC literature are adopted. Preferences are
represented by a GHH-type utility function as follows:

1−γ
Ct − ω −1 Lωt
−1
U (Ct , Lt ) =
1−γ
where

ω

is a positive parameter representing the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in labor

supply, and

γ>0

is the coecient of relative risk aversion. The production function is assumed to

follow a Cobb-Douglas technology with constant returns to scale:

F (Kt , Lt ) = Ktα Lt1−α

where

1>α>0

is the capital share of output. A standard quadratic cost function is used for the

capital adjustment cost:

Φ (x) = 1/2φx2 ;
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φ>0

Finally, the interest rate risk premium is represented by:



p (Dt ) = ψ eDt −D̄ − 1

where

ψ > 0

is a scale parameter that captures the country-specic risk premium.

There is no

set value for all the open economies as the value depends on the country's creditworthiness.

In

the traditional open-economy macroeconomics literature, the assumption of perfect capital mobility
implies this parameter to be equal to zero. Similarly, an extremely high value makes it technically
prohibitive for the open economy to borrow internationally -a state of nancial autarky.

This

parameter, as a result, could serve as a proxy variable for identifying whether a model open economy
is nancially developed (low parameter value) like Canada and the UK, or less developed (relatively
high parameter value) like Greece, Turkey, or Bangladesh.
The steady state (long-run equilibrium) is solved for using the functional forms above, and values
are assigned to the parameters such that the model economy approximately reects the long-run
structure of a typical small open economy such as Canada. Canada is used for two reasons: (1)
parameter values are widely available for Canada, and (2) extensive RBC literature featuring the
Canadian economy can be useful in cross checking business cycles patterns the model generates.
This study primarily follows Mendoza (1991) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) for the commonly
used parameter values, as summarized in Table 2.1. Three notable exceptions are the discount factor

β , the rate of depreciation of physical capital δ , and the persistence of productivity shocks ρz . Unlike
Mendoza (1991) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003), who use annual frequency, this study's model
economy is calibrated to a quarterly frequency. This higher frequency was chosen based on the goal
of analyzing the economy's short-term dynamics following adoption of a given scal stimulus. These
three parameters' values are adjusted to reect the higher frequency.
Table 2.1: Calibration

In the steady state,

α

β

δ

γ

ω

φ

ψ

σz

0.32

0.9901

0.025

2

1.455

0.028

0.0001

0.01

Dt = D̄

and as a result, the country specic risk premium is nil. From one of
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the Euler equations, the value of

β

can easily be calibrated for a quarterly real-world interest rate of

1 percent (approximately 4 percent annually). Based on the Canadian debt-output ratio during the
period 1991-2012, the steady-state debt-output ratio of the model economy is assumed to be 0.60.
This number is consistently assumed for all the calibration exercises except when open-economy
results are compared with those of a closed economy.

To have meaningful comparisons, the two

types of economy need to have identical steady states, given that the closed-economy model has no
external debt. For this purpose, the steady-state level of foreign debt is assumed to be zero when
comparing open and closed economies.

Tax parameters
Next, the scal parameters are set.

In the steady state, the government budget constraint in

equation 2.14 becomes:

T + µI = τL W L + τK SK

(2.22)

T + µ̄I = (τ̄L − η̄L ) W L + (τ̄K − η̄K ) SK

(2.23)

When the economy is on its long-run full employment path, it is assumed there is no scal incentive.
That is,

µ̄ = 0, η̄L = 0

and

η̄K = 0.

Normalizing in terms of output yields:

WL
SK
T
= τ̄L
+ τ̄K
Y
Y
Y
where

T
Y

=θ

is the economy's overall tax burden, and

(2.24)

WL
SK
Y and Y are the labor and capital income

shares, respectively. The above equation can be rewritten as:

(1 − α) τ̄L + ατ̄K = θ

As discussed earlier,

α

(2.25)

is assigned a value commonly used in the RBC literature for the Canadian

economy. For the long-run tax rate on labor income,
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τ̄L ,

the measure of tax wedge that the OECD

6 The long-run overall tax burden in the economy is also obtained from

calculates for Canada is used.

the OECD statistics. Excluding taxes on goods and services, the average tax burden for Canada
from 1965 to 2011 is 23.2 percent.
rate on capital income,

7 Finally, equation 2.25 can be used to obtain the long-run tax

τ̄K .
θ − (1 − α) τ̄L
α

τ̄K =
In sum, the following values are obtained:

(2.26)

θ = 0.232, α = 0.32, τ̄L = 0.31

and

τ̄K = 0.066.8

Magnitude of the scal shocks
Equivalent shocks are given across the dierent scal policy schemes. Each scal response is such
that the tax expenditure's present value (how much the policy costs the taxpayer) is the same.
Assuming the scal shock is given at time



ITC:
for



P olicyCostIT C =

P∞

t=0 β

t It , where

the tax expenditures are determined as follows:

µt = 0 for t < p, and µt = (1 − ρµ ) µ̄t +ρµ µt−1 +µt

t ≥ p.
P olicyCostW S =

WS policy cost:

(1 − ρL ) η̄Lt + ρL ηLt−1 + Lt


tµ

t = p,

CI policy cost:

for

t=0 β

t η W L , where
Lt t t

ηLt = 0

for

t < p

and

ηLt =

t ≥ p.

P olicyCostCI =

(1 − ρK ) η̄Kt + ρK ηKt−1 + Kt

P∞

for

P∞

t=0 β

tη

Kt St Kt , where

ηKt = 0

for

t < p

and

ηKt =

t ≥ p.

The total tax expenditure is set equal to a xed percentage of output (5 percent in the benchmark
case).

Five percent was chosen for no particular reason other than it is a reasonable size given

9 The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA)

recent scal stimulus packages.
6

The OECD denes the total tax wedge as the combined central and sub-central government income tax plus

employee and employer social security contribution taxes, as a percentage of labor costs dened as gross wage
earnings plus employer social security contributions. (OECD (2007))
7

Including taxes on goods and services, the tax burden is 32.7 percent. However, in this study, taxes on goods and

services are excluded because they are not captured in the model as tax revenue, which includes labor and capital
income taxes. Taxes on goods and services are implicitly deduced such that in the long-run equilibrium, government
transfers to the households
8

T,

equal total revenue.

A second alternative can be used to calibrate directly the tax rates on labor and capital incomes.

Instead of
τ̄ W L
using the economy's overall tax burden, the factor- specic tax burdensθL and θK can be used (with θL = LY
and
τ̄K SK
θL
θK
θK = Y .) That is, τ̄L = 1−α and τ̄K = α .
9
It is important to stress that 5 percent of GDP is the policy's lifetime cost. The immediate cost at the time
of implementation depends on several factors, including the shock's magnitude and the policy's persistence.
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For

was approximately 800 billion dollars, t about 5 percent of the U.S.'s GDP. It is worth noting,
however, that the ARRA of 2009 combined many other instruments beside tax incentives. Fiscal
incentives accounted for roughly a third of the stimulus package.

2.4

Results and Discussion

2.4.1 Response to Isolated Fiscal Shocks
Isolated equivalent one-period shocks are given to ITC, wage subsidy, and capital income tax break.
The results are shown 2.1.

Contrary to the ndings by Turnovsky and Sen (1990), this study

nds that temporary shocks only aect the economy in the short-run. Ultimately, all the variables
(including output, employment, capital stock, and consumption) revert to their original long-run
equilibrium.
A wage subsidy policy has the fastest eect on output. In response to a wage subsidy that costs 5
percent of output in terms of tax expenditure, output increases by 1.7 percent in the rst quarter
(Figure 2.1 Panel A). The response to a cost equivalent ITC shock is much slower. The eects on
output start kicking in slowly in the second quarter with a 1.2 percent increase. However, the wage
subsidy's eects are not as long lasting compared to those of the ITC. Following the ITC shock, the
positive impact on output increases steadily to peak at 3.2 percent after 7 quarters, then declines
slowly.

Output stays 1 percent higher than its steady-state level twenty-four quarters after the

initial ITC shock. With a wage subsidy policy, the positive impact on output falls below 1 percent
within four quarters following the shock.
Wage subsidies also have the fastest impact on consumption and employment (Figure 2.1 Panels B
and C). Also, their peak impacts on consumption and labor are much higher than those of ITC.
The wage subsidy policy increases consumption and employment by 1.6 percent and 2.5 percent,
respectively, in the initial period; then the impacts fall quickly to less than 0.5 percent after three
years.

Conversely, the ITC's impacts increase steadily to 1.5 percent for consumption and 2.2

example, an ITC policy that amounts to 5 percent of GDP for its lifetime and that has a persistence coecient of
0.82 (i.e. half-life of 3.5 quarters) will cost 1.3 percent of GDP in the rst period, 0.9 percent in the second period,
and signicantly less thereafter. A similar wage subsidy policy will cost 0.9 percent of GDP in the rst period and
0.8 percent in the second period.
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percent for employment eight quarters after the policy shock, and both impacts stay above 0.5
percent for more than ve years.
Capital income tax break has the weakest impact on the economy in general and on output in
particular. Its impact on output is less than 0.3 percent at its peak. The weak impact of this form
of scal incentive can be explained by the fact that it is applied to existing capital stock and no
additional spending is required of the rm to take advantage of the tax break. Also, given capital
adjustment costs, capital income tax cuts need to be substantial and highly persistent to generate
signicant response.
As expected, the ITC policy shock has signicantly higher impacts on investment than the wage
subsidy policy (Figure 2.1 Panel D). The ITC policy increases investment by almost 80 percent in
the initial period, compared to less than 6 percent for the wage subsidy policy and about 10 percent
for the capital income tax break policy. However, the ITC shock's impacts on investment are not as
long lasting as on output, labor, or consumption. With investment, the ITC's impacts fall quickly
and even become negative after two years.

This investment behavior is discussed in more detail

when the role played by the shocks' persistence is analyzed.
ITC has a strongly negative impact on the current account initially as agents borrow from the rest
of the world to take advantage of the domestic investment incentive. However, after a few quarters,
as the policy ends, the current account becomes positive. This result can be explained by the fact
that part of the observed increase in investment is due to a change of timing of planned investment
spending as opposed to new investment. Compared to ITCs, wage subsidies and capital income tax
breaks have negligible impacts on the trade balance to output ratio.
Overall, the ITC policy generates the highest increase in the household's welfare as measured by
her lifetime utility's present value. The wage subsidy policy follows, and the capital income tax cut

10

policy comes last.
10

It is noteworthy that capital adjustment costs play an important role in the investment's response, especially to

ITC and capital income tax break policies. The commonly used value is assumed for the adjustment cost parameter
(φ=0.028). At the margin, increasing this parameter's value negatively aects the incentive to invest when a proinvestment policy is implemented.
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Multiplying eects and policy returns
Of interest to policymakers is each policy's impact on government revenues. A tax revenue multiplier
is obtained for each policy by dividing the change in tax revenue due to the policy by the cost of the
policy. Dierent time horizons are considered, including 1 to 5 years and lifetime multipliers. Table
2.2 shows the multipliers for the three policies. Each policy costs 1 percent of steady-state output
in terms of tax expenditure.

Multipliers are reported for each of the two sources of tax revenue

(labor income and capital income taxes.) The total revenue multiplier for the ITC policy (Table
2.2 column 4) is greater than 1 for time horizons beyond one year. This result is consistent with
the nding by Judd (1987) that ITC policies are self-nancing through their impact on capital and
labor income taxation. Furthermore, the results in Table 2.2 suggest that most of the positive eect
of the ITC policy on government revenue is through labor income taxation, which accounts for 90
percent of the lifetime multiplier.
Wage subsidies and capital income tax cuts also have a positive impact on government revenue,
but the corresponding multipliers are less than 1, which indicates that these two policies are not
self-nancing. Over their lifetime, they generate additional tax revenues equivalent to 69 percent
and 32 percent of their costs, respectively.
Table 2.2: Revenue Multipliers by Policy

Change in
tax revenue
After 1 year
After 3 years
After 5 years
Lifetime

Investment Tax Credit
Labor Capital Total
only only
0.28 0.05 0.34
1.42 0.16 1.58
2.11 0.22 2.34
2.82 0.29 3.11

Wage Subsidy
Labor Capital Total
only only
0.23 0.02 0.26
0.44 0.05 0.49
0.51 0.05 0.57
0.62 0.06 0.69

Notes. Government revenue comes from two sources: labor income tax

τ̄L Wt Lt

Capital Income Tax Cuts
Labor Capital Total
only only
0.03 0.01 0.03
0.14 0.02 0.16
0.21 0.02 0.24
0.29 0.03 0.32

and capital income tax

τ̄K St Kt .

The

multipliers are obtained by dividing the additional tax revenue generated by the policy (compared to steady-state
revenue) by the cost of the policy. All costs and revenues are discounted using the discount factor

β.

The lifetime

horizon is approximated with 100 quarters.

For each policy, returns are computed for the main macroeconomic aggregates to determine which
policies have the biggest bang for the buck. The policy returns are obtained by relating the gains
from the policy to its cost. For instance, the ITC policy's return in terms of output is obtained by
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dividing the cumulative deviations of output from its steady-state value by the ITC policy cost.

11

The results are shown in Table 2.3. The ITC policy consistently has the highest lifetime returns
in terms of output, consumption, employment, and investment.

The wage subsidy policy comes

12

second except for the returns in terms of investment.

Table 2.3: Policy Returns
(b) Consumption

(a) Output

Investment Wage Capital
Tax Subsidy Income
Credit
Tax Cuts
After 1 year
1.35
1.12
0.14
After 3 years 6.80
2.11
0.69
After 5 years 10.12
2.47
1.03
Lifetime
13.51
2.99
1.37

Investment Wage Capital
Tax Subsidy Income
Credit
Tax Cuts
After 1 year
0.51
0.78
0.05
After 3 years 2.44
1.42
0.25
After 5 years 3.72
1.66
0.38
Lifetime
6.23
2.26
0.63

(c) Employment

(d) Investment

Investment Wage Capital
Tax Subsidy Income
Credit
Tax Cuts
After 1 year
0.34
0.58
0.03
After 3 years 1.70
1.01
0.17
After 5 years 2.53
1.13
0.26
Lifetime
3.38
1.27
0.34

Investment Wage Capital
Tax Subsidy Income
Credit
Tax Cuts
After 1 year 10.41
0.64
1.06
After 3 years 11.29
0.74
1.15
After 5 years 8.83
0.63
0.90
Lifetime
6.84
0.61
0.70

Notes. The returns are obtained by dividing the cumulative present value of the deviations of output, consumption,

employment and investment from their steady-state values by the present value of the policy cost.

The lifetime

horizon is approximated with 100 quarters. The lifetime returns in terms of investment are lower than short-term
returns because investment falls below steady-state after its initial jump (See Figure 2.1 Panel D.)

Persistence of the Fiscal Shocks
Noteworthy is how the scal shocks' persistence aects the results. Fiscal shocks of equal magnitude
(one standard deviation) are applied.
benchmark case with

However, three levels of persistence are considered:

ρ = 0.82 (3 quarters half-life), the low-persistence case with ρ = 0.5 (1 quarter

half-life) and the high-persistence case with
11
12

the

ρ = 0.95

(13 quarters half-life). The results are shown

All gains and costs are in present value terms.
Multipliers and returns were also calculated for the case where the scal policies are pursued as a response to a

negative productivity shocks. No signicant changes are noted in the results.
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in Figure 2.2.
When the ITC shock is weakly persistent, the initial response of investment tends to be much
higher compared to when it is highly persistent. This response could be explained by an investwhile-it-lasts type eect.

That is, agents try to quickly take advantage of the ITC by changing

their capital expenditure timing when the chances of having those tax credits in the near future are
low (little persistence). With an ephemeral ITC policy, investment signicantly increases when the
policy begins, immediately followed by a drop below steady state. Output responds positively; and,
unlike investment, it stays above steady state during the entire adjustment process, regardless of
persistence. However, the peak response of output is much higher when the ITC shock is persistent

13

because more capital is being built when the policy is long lasting.

Regardless of persistence, the capital stock eventually returns to its initial value. No permanent
eect is recorded in any case. This result is in contrast with the ndings by Turnovsky and Sen
(1990) that both temporary and permanent ITCs have similar initial eects on capital accumulation.
Even without a truly permanent ITC policy, agents tend to factor in the scal incentive's availability
going forward. When the incentive is more likely to last, the initial response is much weaker than
when it is perceived as limited-time opportunity.
With wage subsidy shocks of equal magnitude but dierent persistence, the key variables' initial
responses are similar, except for investment.

Contrary to an ITC, a wage subsidy generates a

strong reaction of investment only when the policy is persistent (Figure 2.2 Panel D). Given capital
adjustment costs, a short-lived policy does not give rms enough incentives to add extra capacity in
order to take advantage of lower labor costs. Furthermore, labor cannot be accumulated for future
use as is the case with capital. Hence, an invest-if-it-will-last eect is observed with wage subsidies,
as opposed to invest-while-it-lasts eect with ITCs. That is, a strong initial investment response
results when the wage subsidy policy is long-lasting.

Comparing the peak responses, the high-

persistent wage subsidy boosts investment almost eight times more than a low-persistence subsidy
13

The extreme case where policies have zero persistence is also experimented with. For example, an ITC costing

1 percent of GDP is given in a single period and agents can only take advantage of it based only on new capital
purchased in that period. The main results previously discussed stand. Wage subsidies generate the fastest responses
while ITC generates the longer-lasting impacts. Capital income tax cuts yield the weakest responses. Because of the
lack of persistence, wage subsidies fail to generate a meaningful boost in investment.
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of equivalent magnitude.

2.4.2 Fiscal Policies as Response to a Negative Productivity Shock
Next, the eectiveness of dierent business incentives and their combination as countercyclical scal
policy tools are compared. Instead of giving the policy shock in steady state, an economic downturn
is rst simulated that results from an adverse productivity shock. A negative 1 percent productivity
shock is given, causing output to fall by approximately 2 percent below its steady state in the quarter
when the shock is given. Then the behavior of the economy under ve dierent policies is compared,
one of which is passive and the other four active. The four active scal policies are equivalent in
terms of how much they cost the taxpayer.

For each policy, the rate of tax-credits, tax cuts, or

subsidies are determined, such that the policy's present value cost equals 2 percent of the steadystate output. These rates are calculated using the formula described in the calibration section. The
ve policies are as follows:
Policy 1 -

Do-Nothing:

Under the Do-Nothing policy, no scal incentive is given to boost economic

activity.
Policy 2 -

ITC: The government responds to the recession by providing a temporary ITC to boost

investment. The ITC rate is determined such that the cost is 2 percent of output. In the calibrated
economy, this cost is achieved with an ITC rate of 1.6 percent in the rst quarter the policy is
implemented. That is, for every dollar spent as new capital expenditure, rms get a credit of 1.6
cent on their tax bill.

The ITC rate decays progressively to zero according to the ITC shock's

persistence. The benchmark persistence coecient is set to 0.82, which is the same as productivity
shock's persistence for the Canadian economy.
Policy 3 -

Wage Subsidy:

The government responds with a wage subsidy to lift employment. The

size of the wage subsidy is such that the cost is equivalent to 2 percent of output, translating into a
labor income tax break of 0.6 percentage points in the rst period the policy is implemented. The
tax break then dies over time according to the scal shock's persistence.
Policy 4 -

Capital Income Tax Break:

Under this policy, the government lowers the tax rate

on capital income in an attempt to boost investment and employment. The cost-equivalent capital
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income tax break is 1.2 percentage points.
Policy 5 -

Mix ITC/Wage Subsidy:

This is a cost-equivalent 50/50 mix of an ITC and a wage

subsidy. That is, the government responds to the recession with a scal package that consists of an
ITC and a wage subsidy of similar cost (1 percent of output each). The ITC rate is 0.8 percent,
and the labor income tax is cut 0.2 percentage points. The mixed-policy's cost is equivalent to that
of other policies.
For now, all scal responses are assumed to be implemented in the quarter following the negative
productivity shock. In the next subsection, the scal response's impacts on the results is considered.
Figure 2.3 shows each variable's behavior when the negative shock occurs and when the scal policy
is implemented.

In the quarter when the economy is hit by a negative 1 percent productivity

shock, the output, employment, and consumption fall by 1.9 percent, 1.3 percent, and 0.9 percent,
respectively.

14

Under the passive policy ( Do-Nothing ), the economy progressively recovers at its own pace and
ultimately returns to its original steady state. The pace of this automatic recovery depends mostly
on the productivity shock's persistence. In the model economy, output takes ten quarters to return
to within 0.5 percent of its original steady-state level without any scal stimulus.
Under the ITC policy, investment jumps by 32 percent in the period when the policy is put in place.
However, the impact on output, employment, and consumption lags due to the capital accumulation
process. Output takes three quarters to reach (and surpass) its pre-recession level. Similarly, the
deviation of employment and consumption from their respective steady-state levels become positive
two periods after the beginning of the ITC policy.

The economy continues to expand above its

long-run equilibrium and reaches a peak eight periods after the policy starts, with output at 0.9
percent above steady state.
long-run value.

The capital stock also grows to reach a peak of 2 percent above its

After that initial phase of accelerated investment, the economy starts to settle

down and converges back to its long-run value as the temporary ITC incentive decays. During this
correction period, investment falls considerably and remains below its long-run value for several
years. Although the ITC incentive only lasts a few periods, it takes much longer for output to settle
14

To put these gures in perspective, a 1.3 percent decline in employment means approximately 200,000 jobs lost

in the Canadian economy (or 1.8 million jobs lost in the U.S. economy) in a single quarter.
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down.
When a wage subsidy policy is implemented, the economic impact is felt almost immediately as
output, employment, and consumption jump in the same period the employment incentive is given.
Unlike with the ITC policy, the wage subsidy's eects die down much faster. Expectedly, the wage
subsidy policy has the strongest initial impact on employment.
A capital income tax break of equivalent cost fails to pull the economy out of the hole. The recovery
paths of output, employment and consumption are just slightly better than under the  do-nothing
policy.

Investment is the only variable that tends to be aected by this policy, but the eect is

subdued and fails to provide a meaningful lift to capital stock and output.
As expected, the mixed-policy (wage subsidy/ITC) yields results that fall between what the individual policies generate. The recovery is faster than with the ITC alone, and the impact on the
economy is longer lasting than with only the wage subsidy.

Also noteworthy is that the trade

balance deteriorates signicantly when an ITC is implemented.

It then becomes positive a few

quarters later as the investment falls below long-run equilibrium and the capital stock adjusts. This
non-monotonic behavior of the trade balance is consistent with previous ndings in the literature
(Assibey-Yeboah and Mohsin (2011), Turnovsky and Sen (1990))

Importance of the scal response's timing
In the baseline scenarios, the scal response comes just one quarter after the recession hits. In the
real world, beside automatic stabilizers, such a prompt response is unlikely. Going through dierent
steps leading to scal stimulus takes time.

First, policymakers learn that the economy is going

through a recession due to an adverse shock. This information comes with a lag, given the timing of
measurement and the release of economic indicators. Then, policymakers evaluate possible policy
responses and go through an often long political process to get a stimulus plan approved.

Next

comes the implementation phase, which can also be slow depending on the policy.
The delays in scal policy response are taken into account. As mentioned above, even without a
scal stimulus (Do-Nothing policy), the economy tends to recover automatically after an adverse
shock, though this automatic recovery may be slow. With an ITC or wage subsidy in place, the
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economy bounces back more rapidly.

When the policy response comes several quarters after the

adverse productivity shock, the economy may already be close to full recovery. Figure 2.4 and 2.5
show the paths of the economy with scal responses that occur 3 and 5 quarters after an adverse
shock of low persistence. Late scal responses tend to generate unplanned expansions and accentuate
volatility rather than accelerate recovery. Particularly when a scal response comes 5 quarters after
the adverse shock, the recovery gain for employment is close to nothing, compared to that of the
passive  Do-Nothing policy.

2.4.3 Open versus closed economy
The economy's responses to scal incentives in an open versus closed economy are compared. The
two model economies are calibrated such that the steady states are identical. In the long-equilibrium,
the stock of foreign debt in the open economy is zero. The trade balance and current account are also
set equal to zero in the open-economy steady state to be consistent with the absence of borrowing
opportunity in a closed economy.
As shown in Figure 2.6, an ITC policy generates a much stronger response of investment in an open
economy. A ve percent ITC causes investment to nearly double in an open economy, compared to
just a 12 percent gain in a closed economy. This result can be explained by the current account's
behavior. In an open economy, agents can take full advantage of the ITC incentive by borrowing
from the rest of the world to nance investment. There is a signicant ow of foreign capital into
the economy to invest and benet from the temporary incentive. As a result, the current account
deteriorates deeply when the ITC policy starts. An ITC of one percent causes a current account
decit of nearly 6 percent of output in the initial period. The trade decit shrinks in the subsequent
periods as the economy expands due to the extra capital accumulated.
tapers, the investment level readjusts as capital ows out.
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Also, as the ITC policy

Conversely, no borrowing opportunity exists in a closed economy. To take advantage of the investment incentive, agents must sacrice consumption, thus explaining why consumption falls immediately when the ITC shock occurs. However, because agents value smooth consumption, there is
little room for investment to grow considerably given the budget constraint. An ITC of one percent
causes consumption to fall by only 0.3 percent below its steady state as investment increases by
1.02 percent. Investment's timid response to the ITC policy under a closed economy translates into
a weak impact on the economy in terms of employment and production. The ITC incentive only
slightly aects output and labor in a closed economy.

15

Figure 2.7 shows that the responses a wage subsidy policy generates in a closed economy are similar
to those it generates in an open economy, except for investment. A wage subsidy policy essentially
changes the relative factor price (the wage rental ratio) by making labor relatively cheaper compared
to capital. The change in the wage rental ratio has two types of eects: substitution and output
eects. Both eects are positive for employment. For investment, the substitution eect is negative,
while the output eect is positive.

The rm substitutes capital for labor because the latter is

relatively cheaper due to the wage subsidy.
more capital.

At the same time, the increase in output requires

Unlike capital, labor is not mobile.

Therefore, the payroll scal incentive has the

same eects on employment in closed and open economies. In a closed economy, however, domestic
savings can only be used to nance investment, whereas in an open economy, domestic savings can
also be used to buy foreign assets.

These distinctions explain why a slightly higher investment

response is observed in a closed economy, while a current account surplus combined with a lower
investment increase is observed in an open economy.

2.5

Conclusions

A comprehensive dynamic general equilibrium framework is built to analyze and compare the
macroeconomic eects of various business scal incentives in the context of an open economy. The
model features various scal policy instruments, such as investment tax credits, wage subsidies, and
15

Results similar to the closed-economy results are obtained in the open-economy model by setting the risk premium

parameter

ψ

high enough.
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capital income tax breaks. The alternative scal incentives are set such that they are cost equivalent in terms of tax expenditure. Episodes of economic downturn following an adverse productivity
shock are simulated, and various cost-equivalent scal policy responses are considered.
Wage subsidies tend to have faster impacts on output, but these eects are relatively short. Investment tax credits, on the other hand, tend to have slower but longer lasting impacts. These results
suggest that the scal responses' goals and timing are crucial in deciding what policy is appropriate. This study also nds that all the scal policies considered have positive impacts on government
revenue, but the ITC policy is the only one that is self-nancing (mostly through its impact on
labor income taxation.) Finally, the scal shocks' persistence appears to play an important role in
the initial investment response.
This framework can be extended to analyze the eects of anticipated shocks as well as those of truly
permanent shocks.
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(a) Response of Output

(b) Response of Consumption

(c) Response of Employment

(d) Response of Investment

(e) Response of Capital

(f ) Response of Current Account-to-Output Ratio

Figure 2.1: Comparison of the Key Variables' Responses to Each Fiscal Policy Shock
Notes.

Responses are to equivalent scal policy shocks costing 5 percent of output in terms of cumulative present

value of tax expenditure. Vertical axes are percentage deviations from the long run equilibrium. Horizontal axes are
quarters. All shocks are given in the rst quarter.
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(a) Response of Output to ITC

(b) Response of Investment to ITC

(c) Response of Output to Wage Subsidy

(d) Response of Investment to Wage Subsidy

Figure 2.2: Responses to Fiscal Policy Shocks of Dierent Persistence
Notes. Responses are to one standard deviation ITC or wage subsidy shocks of various persistence. The persistence

values are indicated in subscript. Vertical axes are percentage deviations from the long run equilibrium. Horizontal
axes are quarters. All shocks are given in the rst quarter.
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(a) Response of Output

(b) Response of Employment

(c) Response of Consumption

(d) Response of Investment

(e) Response of Capital

(f ) Response of Current Account-to-Output Ratio

Figure 2.3: Fiscal Policies Following an Adverse Productivity Shock
Notes.

A negative one standard deviation productivity shock is given in period 1, which causes output to fall by

nearly 2 percent.

Fiscal shocks are given in period 2.

Five policies are considered: Do-Nothing, investment tax

credits (ITC), wage subsidies (WS), capital income tax cuts (CI), and mix investment tax credits and wage subsidies
(ITCWS). The scal shocks are such that all policies (except Do-Nothing) have the same present value cost (2
percent of steady-state output.)
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(a) Output

(b) Consumption

(c) Employment

(d) Investment

Figure 2.4: When the Fiscal Response Occurs Three Periods After the Negative Shock
Notes. See notes Figure 2.3. The scal shocks are given three quarters after the adverse productivity shock.

(a) Output

(b) Consumption

(c) Labor

(d) Investment

Figure 2.5: When the Fiscal Response Occurs Five Periods After the Negative shock
Notes. See notes Figure 2.3. The scal shocks are given ve quarters after the adverse productivity shock.
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Figure 2.6: Open Versus Closed Economy: ITC
Notes. The two model economies (open and closed) are calibrated such that they have identical steady state (zero

trade balance and no outstanding debt in the open economy). The responses follow a positive ITC shock given in
period 1. The policy costs 5 percent of steady-state output in present value.
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Figure 2.7: Open Versus Closed Economy: Wage Subsidy
Notes. The two model economies (open and closed) are calibrated such that they have identical steady state (zero

trade balance and no outstanding debt in the open economy). The responses follow a positive wage subsidy shock
given in period 1. The policy costs 5 percent of steady-state output in present value.
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Figure 2.8: Open Versus Closed Economy: Capital Income Tax Break
Notes. The two model economies (open and closed) are calibrated such that they have identical steady state (zero

trade balance and no outstanding debt in the open economy). The responses follow a positive capital income tax cut
given in period 1. The policy costs 5 percent of steady-state output in present value.
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Chapter 3

Millionaires or Job Creators: What
Really Happens to Employment When
You Stick it to the Rich?
3.1

Introduction

The question of raising taxes on individuals at the top of the income distribution continues to
generate passionate debates among economists and lawmakers. This debate is particularly heated
in the U.S., where the growing income concentration since the 1970s has become a major issue (see
for example Atkinson et al. (2011), Autor et al. (2008), Bakija et al. (2012), Mankiw (2013), Piketty
and Saez (2003), and Stiglitz (2012).) The Occupy movement that began in New York City in 2011
and quickly spread to many major cities around the world is a good illustration of current economic
divides. Lately, the stunning success of the bestselling book Capital in the Twenty-rst Century
by Piketty (2014) brought even more attention to the issue. The extreme popularity of Piketty's
book is also the unnecessary yet irrefutable proof that inequality concerns and the redistributive
aspect of tax systems are now more than ever a topic of interest beyond academic circles.

1 However, one key area where

The rich are often a prime target when more tax revenue is needed.
1

California Propositions 63 (2004) and 82 (2006) are good examples (Lee (2011).)
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disagreements emerge is the economy-wide consequences of such tax changes. The purpose of this
essay is to answer with empirical evidence this simple question: Does imposing higher taxes on the
rich help or hurt job creation? The question has important political implications, and opinions on
the matter are highly polarized. Proponents of tax hikes on the rich reject the idea that such tax
increases, which some call the  millionaire tax, negatively aect jobs.

Detractors, on the other

hand, believe that increasing taxes on the wealthy, which they consider  job creators, harms the
economy by hampering job creation, or worse, by destroying existing jobs.
Surprisingly, this important question has received little attention in the empirical tax literature.
Much of the existing literature addresses two related issues. Part of the literature focuses on the
rich by examining how tax changes aecting them inuence outcomes like their taxable income,
labor supply, or interstate migration.

Goolsbee (2000), for instance, uses detailed compensation

data on corporate executives to evaluate their taxable income's responsiveness to the increased
marginal tax rates in 1993. He nds a signicant decline in taxable income among executives at
the top of the income distribution in the short run, but very little responsiveness in the long run.
Goolsbee concludes that the observed decline is more of a short-run shift in compensation timing
rather than a permanent change in taxable income. Slemrod (2000) presents an excellent review of
the literature regarding the behavioral responses of the auent when they are taxed more heavily.
(See also Piketty et al. (2014) and Saez et al. (2012)). This work diers from these studies as it is
interested in the economy-wide consequences of taxing the rich.
Another line of the scal policy literature examines the impact of general tax hikes (or tax cuts)
on aggregate employment or, more generally, the macroeconomic eects of tax changes.

Most

economists agree that, in general, tax increases have negative eects on gross domestic product
(GDP) via multiplying eects. However, there is little agreement on the tax multiplier's magnitude.
The endogenous nature of scal policy changes creates a challenge in empirically isolating tax
changes' true impact on economic activity.

Two prominent papers recently addressed this issue

using new approaches. Romer and Romer (2010) construct a new measure of exogenous tax changes
based on analyses of narrative records, such as presidential speeches and congressional reports.
They separate all legislated tax changes that occurred in the postwar period into endogenous and
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exogenous categories. Using their new measure of exogenous tax changes, they nd that the negative
eects of tax increase on economic activity are much larger than those obtained using broader
measures. Barro and Redlick (2011) estimate the macroeconomic eects of government purchases
and taxes using Ramey (2009)'s defense news variable and a newly constructed measure of average
marginal tax rate (AMTR). They nd signicantly negative eects of tax increases on GDP, with
an estimated tax multiplier around -1.1. Other researchers that have investigated this issue include
Alm and Rogers (2010), Auten et al. (2008), and Böhringer et al. (2005). These studies are related
to this one in the sense that they investigate economy-wide impacts of tax changes. However, the
focus of this study is on tax increases for the well-to-do only, holding the economy's overall tax
pressure constant.
Perhaps the closest work to this study is that of Zidar (2013). Using Romer and Romer (2010)'s
narrative-based exogenous tax changes, Zidar constructs a measure that distinguishes which income
groups received those tax changes.

He nds that the negative relationship between tax changes

and economic growth is mostly driven by lower-income groups. Specically, tax cuts that benet
the bottom 90 percent have large positive eects on growth, while tax cuts that go to the top 10
percent have small and statistically insignicant eects.

This study diers from Zidar (2013) in

many regards. One key dierence is the focus on tax changes aecting the very top of the income
distribution. Based on the 2011 IRS statistics of income, the top 10 percent income class (used by
Zidar) included households with an adjusted gross income of $133,000 or more. By most denitions,
this group includes much of the middle class. In this study, the top 1 percent is used as the baseline.
This study also considers alternative thresholds, such as 0.1 percent, 0.5 percent, and 5 percent. In
addition, unlike Zidar (2013) who partly relies on compositional dierences in income groups across
states for identication, this study exploits variation in relative federal tax burden by income group
across time. Zidar justies his approach as follows: If tax cuts for high income earners generate
substantial economic activity, then states with a large share of high income taxpayers should grow
faster following a tax cut for high income earners.

This assertion can be problematic given the

nearly perfect capital mobility across U.S. states, and the fact that much of the economic activity
generated in a given state can be linked to high-income earners residing in a dierent state.
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This essay contributes to the literature by providing rare empirical evidence on the causal relationship between the relative tax burden of the rich and aggregate employment growth. Both short-run
and long-run eects are investigated. A new time series on relative tax burden is constructed by
income groups based on the IRS statistics of income.

The empirical framework builds on Barro

and Redlick (2011) and Romer and Romer (2010). This study also adds to the larger discussion
on rising income inequality by shedding some light on the macroeconomic consequences of purely
redistributive tax policies.
The results show that an increase in the relative share of tax paid by the rich has strong and statistically signicant positive eects on net job creation in the short run. In the preferred specication,
a 1 percentage point increase in the share of tax paid by the top percentile of taxpayers is associated with an increase of quarterly payroll employment growth by 0.05 percentage points (or 22,500
additional jobs added per month.) Findings also include evidence of negative eects in the long run,
though the cumulative net impact (both short and long runs) is positive. The main results hold to
a number of robustness checks, including restricting the sample to a period of exclusively exogenous
tax changes, based on the narrative record analysis in Romer and Romer (2010). The results are
also consistent across alternative specications and estimation methods, including unrestricted and
Bayesian VARs.
Although the transmission mechanisms' structural identication is beyond the scope of this study,
possible explanations for the results are provided. According to basic textbook Keynesian theory,
increasing taxes in general has a negative impact on aggregate output through the negative multiplying eect. However, the tax multiplier's magnitude is increasing in the marginal propensity to
consume. For example, a purely redistributive policy change (no change in revenue) that increases
the tax burden on the rich and lowers everyone else's would have a negative eect on the one hand
due to the tax hike on the rich, and a positive eect on the other hand due to the tax break for
everyone else. Because the rich have a lower marginal propensity to consume, the positive eect
outweighs the negative. Therefore, a revenue neutral redistributive tax policy would have a positive
net eect within a simple Keynesian framework. This analysis also holds if the tax hike on the rich
is used to nance government spending. In theory, the positive government spending multiplying
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eect outweighs a tax increase's negative multiplying eect. This relationship is particularly true
when the tax increase is only for the rich, given their lower marginal propensity to consume.
While the short-run impact seems obvious, at least within a Keynesian framework, whether the
benets persist in the long run is a dierent story.

Increasing the tax burden on the rich could

harm job creation in the long-run through the investment channel.

This eect is related to the

claim that the rich are the  job creators, possessing the resources to invest both in physical capital
and innovative ventures. Taxing them more heavily arguably reduces that incentive at the margin.
As argued in Mankiw (2013), society should not be concerned about a fraction of the population
aspiring to become super rich, as long as the process is socially productive. For instance, gamechanging innovators like Steve Jobs are to be encouraged.
This study abstracts from the theoretical transmission mechanisms and focuses on the empirical
evidence of the causal relationship between taxing the rich and employment growth. The remainder
of the essay is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses methodological issues and identication
strategies. Section 3 presents the newly constructed time series on relative tax burden by income
group and briey discusses the rest of the data.

Section 4 presents the results.

Section 5 is the

conclusion.

3.2

Methodological Issues

Addressing the overall employment impact of a tax hike on the rich can be challenging in terms of
identication and data availability. While showing a correlation between employment growth and
an increase in the tax burden on the rich may be straightforward, establishing a causal relationship
requires more care. In this section, the identication issues faced and the strategies used to overcome
those issues are addressed.
Consider the following simple equation:

yt = α + β∆Tt + εt
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(3.1)

where

yt =

Yt −Yt−1
is a measure of employment growth,
Yt−1

on the rich, and

εt

Tt

is a measure of the relative tax burden

represents all the other factors, both observed and unobserved, that aect the

growth of employment. Changes in some of those factors cause the relative tax burden on the rich
to change as well.

One issue that comes to mind when estimating macroeconomic tax eects is

the endogenous relationship between scal policy changes and economic activity. Policymakers may
react to economic uctuations and make scal changes for stabilization purposes. To the extent that
those tax changes equally aect all income levels, the measure of tax burden on the rich should be
expected to be exogenous after controlling for the economy's overall tax pressure. However, through
the political process generating scal policy changes, the well-to-do could possibly end up with a
change in their tax burden that diers from that of the remaining taxpayers. Estimating equation
3.1 would lead to a biased estimate of

β

under these conditions.

The identifying assumption is made that tax changes occurring one or more years earlier are not

2 Thus, the following alternative equation is considered:

determined by the economy's current state.

yt = α +

J
X

βj ∆Tt−j + δ1 Ut−1 + δ2 T Pt−1 + εt

(3.2)

j=1
where

Ut−1

is a lagged business cycle indicator (the unemployment rate for example) and

is a measure of the overall tax pressure in the economy.

T Pt−1

To account for the amount of slack in

the economy, To account for the amount of slack in the economy,

Ut−1

is added.

As argued in

Barro and Redlick (2011) and in Romer and Romer (2010), omitted variables that are orthogonal
to the tax variable when a lagged business cycle indicator is added are not a source of bias for
the scal eects. This control is particularly important here since this study is not fully modeling
employment growth.

Rather, it is merely interested in the sign of the partial eects (if any) on

employment growth resulting from a tax increase on the rich.
Another potential endogeneity concern is the possibility of heterogeneous income growth during
2

Under certain circumstances, the contemporaneous tax variable could be treated as exogenous as well, as described

in Blanchard and Perotti (2002). With quarterly data, for example, it is hard to imagine that policymakers can (1)
learn about a problem in the economy; (2) design a policy to correct the problem; and (3) implement that policy,
all within the same period. Even with annual data, this contemporaneous reaction is still problematic, although not
impossible.
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certain expansions or recessions.

For example, for a particular episode of economic boom, the

rich could see their income grow faster than that of the remaining.

Consequently, their relative

share of tax burden would increase due to the economic expansion, not the other way around.
Using lagged tax variables partially addresses this issue.

However, without specically modeling

aggregate employment growth's dynamics, there is still a risk of capturing correlation as causation
in equation 3.2.
To address this issue, the heterogeneity in income composition across income groups is exploited. A
simple examination of Figure 3.1 reveals that taxpayers on the right tail of the income distribution
receive predominantly capital income (capital gains, interests, and dividends). On the other hand,
labor income (salaries and wages) represents the bulk of the low- to middle-income classes' revenue.

Figure 3.1: Composition of Income by AGI Class in 2000
Figure source: Tax Policy Center

To rule out reverse causation, the assumption is made that an episode of economic expansion causing
the relative tax burden of the rich to increase due to their relative income growth is captured by the
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dierential of growth in capital versus labor income. The variable RIG (relative income growth) in
equation 3.3 is a measure of the dierence between the growth rate of capital income and that of
labor income for all taxpayers.

yt = α +

J
X

βj ∆Tt−j + δ1 Ut−1 + δ2 T Pt−1 + δ3 RIGt−1 + εt

(3.3)

j=1
The regression analysis is complemented with a reduced-form VAR(p) specied as follows:

yt =v1 +

∆Tt =v2 +

P
X

a1p yt−p +

P
X

p=1

p=1

P
X

P
X

a2p yt−p +

p=1

b1p ∆Tt−p + ε1t
(3.4)

b2p ∆Tt−p + ε2t

p=1

The testable assumption is made that the errors in system 3.4 are not contemporaneously correlated.
More generally, innovations in the employment equation are assumed to be independent from those
in the tax equation.
The VAR approach complements the analysis in three ways. First, including many lags of the dependent variables establishes a more general specication of employment growth's dynamics without
necessarily modeling its determinants. The second advantage is the possibility of analyzing longerrun employment eects of tax hikes on the rich, using orthogonalized impulse response functions.
Finally, the VAR approach can help disentangle some of the mechanisms through which a tax hike
on the rich may aect employment. Various components of GDP (e.g. consumption, investment)
are alternatively added as a third dependent variable to the reduced-form VAR as shown in the
system of equations 3.5:

yt =v1 +

∆Tt =v2 +

Ct =v3 +

P
X

a1p yt−p +

P
X

b1p ∆Tt−p +

P
X

p=1

p=1

p=1

P
X

P
X

P
X

a2p yt−p +

b2p ∆Tt−p +

p=1

p=1

p=1

P
X

P
X

P
X

p=1

a3p yt−p +

b3p ∆Tt−p +

p=1
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p=1

c1p Ct−p + ε1t

c2p Ct−p + ε2t

c3p Ct−p + ε3t

(3.5)

3.3

Data

Tax Data
A time series is constructed on relative federal individual income tax burden by income group, using
data from the Statistics of Income (SOI), published annually by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
and available from 1913.
The preferred explanatory variable is the share of tax liability that falls on the rich, with the
denition of rich based purely on income. By default, taxpayers in the top percentile of the pre-tax
income distribution (the so-called  1 percent ) are considered rich. Alternative thresholds, such as
0.1, 0.5, 5, 10 or 20 percent, are considered throughout the analysis.

3

To obtain a given income group's share of tax liability, the tax liability of that group is divided by
all taxpayers' total tax liability for the year. Henceforth, this variable is referred to as taxshare.
Using the share of tax liability has many advantages over other commonly used measures, such as
marginal tax rate or average marginal tax rate.
First, taxshare captures all federal individual income taxes, regardless of the income source. Given
the U.S. tax system's complexity (itemized deductions, AMT, various credits, and loopholes), determining a specic tax rate that truly reects individual taxpayers' tax burden can be challenging.
This challenge is particularly true regarding the most auent taxpayers because they are generally
better equipped to take advantage of all legal opportunities to minimize their tax liabilities.

In

2013 for instance, more than half of the combined benets of the top 10 federal tax expenditures
went to the top quintile, according to CBO estimates (CBO (2013).) The top one percent received
17 percent of those benets. By using the share of liabilities, this diculty can be circumvented
because this measure is the actual relative burden that falls on the wealthy after accounting for all
possible tax treatments. For example, many lawmakers advocate closing tax loopholes that tend to
favor the rich. Closing those loopholes will not be captured by marginal rates but will be clearly
3

As discussed in Slemrod (2000), there are some caveats in using annual income as the metric to dene rich. For

example, a household that receives a one-time high income in a given year may be misleadingly classied as rich.
Slemrod (2000) also discusses alternative auence indicators, such as wealth, lifetime consumption, and lifetime
income. In this study, annual income is used because it is the only measure for which data is available by group for
multiple years.

62

reected in the share of tax burden falling on the rich because they are the largest beneciaries.
Without being specic about what deductions or tax expenditures are being eliminated, changes
in the tax system resulting in eectively shifting relative burden from the masses to the well-to-do
and vice versa can be captured.
Second, taxshare is to some extent robust to changes in income aecting the entire distribution
spectrum. When everybody in the economy gets richer (at the same pace), the  one percent group
does not change. This matters for identication. For example, consider a non-tax-related unobserved
shock that boosts economic activity (employment and income). Such a shock causes everyone's taxes
to increase at the same time because of higher tax brackets. This aects the average eective tax
rate and the average marginal tax rate by income group, rendering those variables endogenous.
However, such a shock would not aect the tax share by percentile because as everyone's income
and taxes increase, the income distribution remains the same, as does each percentile's share of tax
liability. The only case in which the tax share by percentile (say, for the rich) would be aected
without a change in scal policy is if the income of the rich grows at a dierent pace than that of
the remaining population.

In that case, the relative growth control variable should capture that

eect, leaving the taxshare variable exogenous.

4

A somewhat less desirable alternative measure of the tax pressure on the rich is their eective
average income tax rate.

Henceforth, this variable is referred to as averagetaxrate or ATR. To

obtain this measure, the income group's tax liability is divided by the corresponding total income.
For example, the eective average tax rate for the top quintile is the ratio of the aggregated tax
liability of taxpayers in the top quintile to the aggregated income reported by those taxpayers. As
discussed earlier, this variable is more prone to endogeneity than taxshare.

Employment and Economic Activity Data
The main dependent variable of this study is the growth rate of seasonally adjusted payroll employment. Up-to-date monthly payroll employment data are readily available from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS) starting in 1939. The unemployment rate and other labor force statistics
4

As discussed earlier, the heterogeneity in income composition is exploited across income groups for this control.

(See identication section.)
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are also collected from the BLS. The data on gross domestic product (GDP) and its components
are collected from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The 2009 chained measures for GDP
and its components are used in this study. Finally, the income composition data used to compute
the variable

RIG

are from the SOIs.

Frequency and Range of Data
The tax variables are observed annually (federal returns) while most of the economic activity variables are available at least quarterly. Two sets of regressions based on each frequency are run. Each
frequency has its advantages. The annual data eliminates having to deal with seasonality issues in
macroeconomic variables (Romer and Romer (2010)). With quarterly data, the variation in employment can be better captured. Even though the tax liability variables are observed annually (when
returns are led), thinking of them as constant throughout the scal year makes sense. First, all
tax laws applicable for a given year (including rates, brackets, and deductions) are typically known
at the beginning of the year or long before. In addition, taxpayers are assumed to have a reasonable
idea of their annual income for the current year. As such, they are aware of their annual tax burden
throughout the year. Therefore, the tax burden variables are considered constant within years, and
the annual observations are replicated in all four quarters of the year.
The sample covers the period from 1947Q1 to 2011Q4. Although annual data exist back to 1939
for most economic activity variables, including payroll employment, the tax distribution data for
the World War II period is problematic. For some years between 1939 and 1945, close to half of
the returns were not allocated to any income group (classied as not distributed in the SOIs). In
addition, important changes, including requirements to le, occurred between 1939 and 1947. The
number of returns reported in the SOIs went from 7 million in 1939 to close to 50 million by 1945.
Since only the led returns are observed, signicant changes in requirements to le can aect the
distribution and the denition of rich and, therefore, render comparison across time problematic.
Summary statistics of the key variables are in Table 3.1.

64

Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
N

Mean

St. Dev.

Min

Max

268

.4298507

.6678301

-1.7

2.9

Share Top 1pct

260

24.73231

6.643535

15.6

39

Average Tax Rate Top 1pct

260

28.81385

3.515212

22.3

36.5

Average Tax Rate All

260

13.18769

1.179033

9

15.8

GDP growth

267

.7992509

.9758356

-2.6

4

U-Rate

264

5.825379

1.66368

2.6

10.7

RIG

244

2.406496

13.10341

-37.30811

33.157

Payroll growth

Notes. The data are quarterly from 1947Q1 to 2011Q4.

RIG

is the relative income growth of capital versus

labor income.

3.4

Results

3.4.1 General Results
Equation 3.3 is estimated using quarterly data. At rst, only one lag of the independent variable
of interest, taxsharetop1pct, is considered; this variable measures the share of tax liability falling on
the top 1 percent of the population. The results are reported in Table 3.2. For all four columns,
the dependent variable is the quarterly growth rate of seasonally adjusted payroll employment.
The estimated coecients on the lagged tax burden variable (taxsharetop1pct ) are positive and
statistically signicant in all four specications. In the equation with all controls (column 4), the
estimated coecient is 0.050 (s.e.=0.023).

That is, a 1 percentage point increase in the share

of federal individual income tax liability falling on the rich is associated with an increase of 0.05
percentage point in quarterly payroll employment growth (or 0.2 percentage point annually). To
put this result in perspective, an annual growth of 0.2 percent means 22,500 additional jobs per
month, assuming 135 million current nonfarm payroll employment jobs in the U.S. economy.
The lagged unemployment rate is included to account for unobservables that are correlated with
the business cycle. The growth rate of GDP is also added as a control variable. Since employmentgrowth behavior is not being explicitly modeled, adding GDP growth allows capturing the eects of
most determinants of the dependent variable that are orthogonal to the tax variable. In principle,
omitting those orthogonal variables should not bias the estimates. However, it helps improve the
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overall explanatory power of the model, especially given the limited time-series sample size.

5 As

expected, the estimated coecient on GDP growth is positive and statistically signicant, meaning,
ceteris paribus, GDP growth is associated with job growth.

The economy's overall tax pressure is controlled by using the average tax rate for all taxpayers (total
tax collected divided by total income for all taxpayers in a given year). The purpose of this control
is to partial out the general eects of tax hikes aecting everyone. With this control, the coecient
on taxshare reveals what happens when the relative tax burden on the rich is increased while holding
the economy's overall tax pressure constant. That tax policy change is purely redistributive. Finally,
the dierential in capital versus labor income growth (RIG) is controlled for.

This control helps

rule out increases in the tax share of the rich due to income growth less wealthy taxpayers do not
experience. The estimated coecients for these two controls are mostly insignicant.
Next, the equation in column 4 of Table 3.2 is re-estimated using alternative thresholds to dene
rich.

Alternatively, the richest 0.1, 0.5, 1, and 5 percent taxpayers are considered.

The results

are shown in 3.3. Column 3 of Table 3.3 uses the baseline denition (1 percent) and serves as a
benchmark. The results generally hold across thresholds, except for the top 0.5 percent and to some

6

extent the top 0.1 percent.

The eects on employment growth of increasing other income groups' taxshare is considered. To
that end, the same equation is estimated using the ve quintiles as well as the bottom 50 percent
income groups.

The results are shown in 3.4.

Increasing the top quintile's tax share appears to

have a positive statistically signicant eect on employment.

This eect is consistent with the

previous results using narrower denitions of rich. The estimated coecient of 0.067 (s.e.=0.025) is
34 percent higher than that of the baseline regression (top 1 percent). Interestingly, increasing the
fourth quintile's taxshare has a strong negative and statistically signicant eect on employment
growth. The estimated coecient on the fourth quintile's taxshare is -0.088 (s.e.=0.026).
To understand this result's implications, it is important to determine which taxpayers fall into this
income class. In 2011, the latest year in this study's sample, the fourth quintile includes households
5
6

The adjusted

R2

largely increases from less than 0.05 to more 0.50 once GDP growth is added.

One possible explanation for inconsistent results above the top 1 percent threshold is the level of detail in income

classication in the IRS reports.

For example, the top income class in the 2011 Statistics of Income (SOI) is $1

million or more, including 290,000 households (0.2 percent of taxpayers.)

66

Table 3.2: Eects of Increasing Tax Share of The Top 1 percent on Payroll Employment Growth

VARIABLES

Lagged Taxshare Top 1%

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Empl.

Empl.

Empl.

Empl.

0.0874***

0.0630***

0.0657***

0.0497**

(0.0266)

(0.0165)

(0.0156)

(0.0231)

-0.0516***

-0.0389**

-0.0509**

Lagged Unemployment
Rate

GDP Growth

(0.0161)

(0.0170)

(0.0205)

0.488***

0.494***

0.497***

(0.0373)

(0.0365)

(0.0366)

0.101*

0.0721

(0.0516)

(0.0567)

Lagged Average Tax Rate
All

Lagged RIG

0.00472
(0.00296)

Constant

Observations
Adjusted

R2

0.423***

0.332***

0.254**

0.299**

(0.0417)

(0.100)

(0.107)

(0.122)

256

256

256

244

0.049

0.549

0.560

0.570

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes. Data are quarterly from 1947Q1 to 2011Q4. The dependent variable is the quarterly growth rate of nonfarm

payroll employment. Four-period seasonal dierence and one year lag are used for variables that are only observed
yearly (federal income tax variables).

Average Tax Rate All is total tax collected divided by total income for all

taxpayers in a given year. RIG (relative income growth) is the dierential in capital versus labor income growth.
Capital income includes capital gains, dividends, and interests. Labor income includes salary and wages.

with adjusted gross income (AGI) between $45,000 and $85,000, meaning much of the middle class
fall into the fourth quintile. Therefore, the results suggest that increasing the middle class's relative
tax burden signicantly harms job growth. Statistically signicant eects are not found for lower
income groups.

3.4.2 Short Versus Long Run Eects
To capture the eects of tax increase in both the short and long runs, equation 3.3 including multiple
lags of the taxshare variable is estimated. The results are shown in 3.5. In columns 1 and 2, 16
quarterly lags are included. The contemporaneous variable is also included in column 1. Although
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none of the estimated coecients is individually signicant, they are jointly signicant by groups
of 3 or 4 consecutive lags.

These results are not surprising given the tax variable's frequency.

As noted earlier, the tax variables are only observed annually, but the true values are assumed
constant throughout the year. Thus, quarterly tax variables are obtained by replicating the yearly
observations to all four quarters of the year. By construction, two consecutive quarterly lags are
identical for three out of four quarters. Consequently, adding consecutive quarterly lags does not
add much additional information to the model but does dilute the tax variables' eects.
To circumvent this issue, including only one lag every four quarters for 4 years is considered.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3.5 show the results using this approach.

7

Column 4 is the preferred

specication because of potential endogeneity issues associated with using contemporaneous tax
variables, as discussed in section 2. Positive and statistically signicant eects are found for the
rst- and second- year lags (that is quarterly lags 4 and 8). In addition, negative and statistically
signicant eects are found for the third and fourth years (quarterly lags 12 and 16).

These re-

sults suggest that although increasing the relative tax burden of the rich has positive eects on
employment growth in the short run, it may hurt job growth in the long run. However, in terms
of magnitude, the positive short-run eects appear to slightly dominate the long-run eects. The
estimated coecients for the rst- and second-year lags are 0.084 (s.e. = 0.020) and 0.044 (s.e. =
0.015), respectively. The estimated coecients for the third- and fourth-year lags are -0.039 (s.e.
= 0.017) and -0.053 (s.e.

= 0.016), respectively.

The cumulative eects of all four lags is 0.035

(pvalue<0.01). That is approximately 50,000 jobs added quarterly.

8

3.4.3 Robustness Checks
Using Romer and Romer's Exogenous Tax Change Period
Section 2 discussed potential endogeneity issues due to economic conditions causing tax changes
instead of the other way around. To deal with this issue, the assumption was made that tax changes
7

That is, the coecients are eectively restricted on all other quarterly lags to zero. This assumption is relaxed

later on in the Bayesian VAR analysis using informative priors.
8

Calculation based on 135 million current jobs in the U.S. economy)
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occurring one or more years earlier are not determined by the economy's current state. However,
it is conceivable that policymakers forecast changes in economic conditions several periods ahead
and initiate tax changes in anticipation.
exogenous.

If so, even lagged tax variables may not be completely

To assess the estimates' robustness to this unlikely but potential issue, Romer and

Romer (2010)'s analysis of all federal tax policy changes occurring in the U.S. in the postwar period
is used.
Using narrative records such as presidential speeches and congressional reports, Romer and Romer
(2010) separate all legislated tax changes that occurred in the postwar period into two broad categories: endogenous and exogenous tax changes . They classify as  endogenous those tax changes
made in response to factors likely to aect economic activity in the near future.
include countercyclical tax policies and those driven by government spending.

Such changes

They classify as

 exogenous those tax changes that are not made to oset other factors causing output growth to
deviate from normal. These include long-run growth and decit-driven tax changes.
A careful examination of the results of Romer and Romer (2010)'s narrative analysis reveals an
opportunity to exploit their ndings to test the robustness of this study's estimates.

Figure 3.2

shows all legislated tax changes in the postwar period classied in the exogenous (Panel A) and
endogenous (Panel B) categories. Almost all the tax changes that occurred between 1976 and 2001
appear to fall in the exogenous category.
Henceforth, the period from 1977Q1 to 2000Q4 is referred to as the Romer and Romer exogenous
tax change period.

The model is estimated for that restricted sample.

The results are shown in

Table 3.6. Regardless of the threshold denition of rich considered, strong positive and statistically
signicant coecients are found. An increase in the relative tax burden of the rich does positively
aect employment growth in the short run. The eects are also larger than those found using the
full sample. This nding is consistent with Romer and Romer (2010)'s nding that the eects of
exogenous tax increases are much larger than those found using broader measures of tax changes.
As with the full sample, multiple lags are added in attempting to replicate the short- versus longrun analysis. Table 3.7 shows the results. The estimated coecients for the rst- and second-year
lags are still positive and strongly signicant. Although the estimated coecients for the long run
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(third- and fourth-year lags) keep their negative signs, they are not statistically signicant. With
the limited length of the Romer and Romer's exogenous tax change period (23 years), this (lack of )
result for the long run is not surprising.

Using Changes in Tax Liability (Instead of Taxshare )
Using the share of tax paid by the high income groups as explanatory variable of interest, the results
consistently show that an increase in the relative tax burden of the rich is associated with higher
job growths. However, it could be the case that what really matters for employment growth is not
the tax burden on the rich, but rather, the tax burden on everyone else. In other words, the results
could be driven by tax cuts for the middle and low income classes, rather than by tax hikes on the
rich. Or it could be a combination of both. Because the taxshare variable is a relative measure, it
does not dierentiate between the two eventualities.
To understand what side really drives the results, a dierent specication is experimented with.
Instead of taxshare, the changes in tax liability for the top earners and for everyone else are included
in the model. That is, payroll employment growth is regressed on changes in tax liability for the top
1 percent and for the bottom 99 percent (top 5 percent and bottom 95 percent are also considered)
along with the usual controls.
The results are shown in Table 3.8. It appears clearly that tax changes for the rich (Top 1 percent
and Top 5 percent) are statistically signicant, and the signs of the coecients are consistent with
the previous results. The eects of changes for the bottom 99 percent and bottom 95 percent are
not statistically signicant. This is true whether or not the overall level of taxes constant is held
constant (Columns 1 and 3 versus Columns 2 and 4 in Table 3.8). These results suggest that tax
changes for the rich indeed matters.
To address concerns over of potential correlation between changes in taxes for the Top 1 percent
and the Bottom 99 percent (respectively Top 5 percent and Bottom 95 percent), the two variables
are alternatively added to the model. As shown in Table 3.9, the results stand: the eects of tax
changes for the rich on employment growth are statistically signicant.
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Other Robustness Checks
An alternative measure of relative tax burden on the rich is tried using the average tax rate per

9 Table 3.10 shows the results using

income class instead of tax share.

ATR instead of taxshare.

Similar results as with the baseline are found. That is, an increase in the relative tax burden of the
rich has positive eects on employment growth in the short run.
The estimations are also replicated using annual data to address concerns regarding use of yearlyobserved tax variables in quarterly estimations. As shown in Table 3.11, the results are generally
consistent with the quarterly estimations. Positive short-run eects and negative long-run eects
are found. The estimated coecients on the rst and second lags are, respectively, 0.209 (s.e. =
0.097) and 0.207 (s.e. = 0.066), roughly four times the average quarterly coecients (see Table 3.5).

3.4.4 Results of VAR Analysis
Unrestricted VAR
The vector autoregressive (VAR) approach is used to complement the regression analysis of the
short- and long-run eects of increasing taxes on the rich. With the VAR approach, the dynamics
of employment growth can be systematically captured by including its own lags. In addition, by
using impulse response functions, the impact of tax variable innovations can be better tracked over
time and short- and long-run eects can be better distinguished. The VAR Granger (non-)causality
test is also performed to investigate possibilities of reverse causation.

10 The

The system of equations 3.4 is rst estimated as an unrestricted VAR with 16 quarterly lags.

11 Next, the same logic is followed as with

impulse response functions (IRF) are shown in Figure 3.3.

the single-equation regressions, and consecutive quarterly lags of the same year are excluded. Specifically, lags 1, 4, 8, 12 and 16 are included. Figure 3.4 shows the IRF for this second specication.
The general patterns of the IRFs are the same for the full and reduced models.
9
10

The average tax rate is obtained as the ratio of tax liability by adjusted gross income per income class.
Various VAR lag order selection criteria (including AIC, LR and SC) are used to determine the approximate lag

length.
11

The generalized impulses (GIRF) as described in Pesaran and Shin (1998). Because no contemporaneous corre-

lation exists in the VAR residuals (tested), the GIRF results do not dier much from the simple non-orthogonalized
IRFs or the Cholesky-orthogonalized IRFs.
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The IRF in Panel B (Figure 3.4) shows the response of employment growth to an exogenous change
in the tax share of the rich and how that response varies over time.

12

Two interesting results

appear. A positive and statistically signicant impact appears in the short run (1 to 2.5 years after
the shock), and a negative and statistically signicant impact appears in the long run (4 years after
the shock). The cumulative eects stays positive in both the short and the long run as shown in
Panel B of 3.5. These VAR results are consistent with the ndings in the single equation regression
analysis.
Panel C (Figure 3.4) shows that the taxshare variable is not signicantly aected by exogenous
changes in employment growth. This nding eliminates concerns of potential reverse causation. A
Granger (non-)causality test was performed after the VAR and the results shown in Table 3.12 conrm the absence of causation from employment growth to taxshare. Conversely, the null hypothesis
of absence of causation from taxshare to employment growth is rejected at the 1 percent level.

Bayesian VAR
One natural problem with VAR estimations is the need for large samples because of the high number
of coecients to estimate. For example, in the system 3.4 VAR with two endogenous variables, 16
lags, and at least one exogenous variable (the constant term),
be estimated.

2 ∗ (16 ∗ 2 + 1) = 66 coecients

must

With 3 endogenous variables (system 3.5), the number of coecients to estimate

increases to 147. This high number of parameters to estimate is certainly an issue given the limited
sample size.

One way to deal with this issue is to restrict some of the coecients to zero by

excluding some lags altogether. This step was taken in the select lag unrestricted VAR specication
discussed earlier. However, Bayesian VAR provides an alternative that does not require imposing
these extreme restrictions. However, Bayesian VAR provides an alternative that does not require
imposing these extreme restrictions.
In the Bayesian VAR specication, all the lags are included that would optimally be included if
the sample size were not a concern (16 lags in this case). The coecient-specic prior distributions
are then specied to convey additional information about the model.
12

A modied version of the

Panels A and D show the response of each endogenous variable to its own shocks and are not of much interest in

this study.
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Litterman-Minnesota priors is used.

13

The modication pertains to the treatment of annually

observed variables. Because the taxshare variable only changes every four quarters, lags 4, 8, 12 and
16 are allowed to have diuse priors. All other prior variances are calculated based on commonly
used hyper-parameters for Minnesota priors. The Bayesian VAR's results are illustrated in 3.6. The

14

general patterns are similar to what are obtained in the unrestricted VAR analysis.

3.5

Conclusions

The impact of increasing taxes on the rich using U.S. time series data from the IRS Statistics of
Income has been empirically investigated.

Positive and statistically signicant short-run eects

have been identied. Increasing the relative tax burden on the rich does lead to higher employment
growth in the short run and some negative long-run eects. However, the net cumulative eects stay
positive in the long run. In trying alternative specication and estimation approaches, the results
remain the same. As a robustness check, the sample is restricted to a period of purely exogenous
tax changes based on Romer and Romer (2010)'s narrative record analysis. Along with the results
holding in the restricted  exogenous sample, the eects are even stronger. This nding is consistent
with that of Romer and Romer (2010): estimated tax eects obtained using their restrictive measure
of exogenous tax changes are larger than those found using broader measures of tax changes.
One of the limitations of this study is that the transmission mechanisms of the eects are not
structurally identied. This is certainly an area where future work could be done. Explanations for
what drives the results are provided. Some of the positive eects observed in the short run are likely
driven by redistribution eects via consumption, while investment possibly drives the negative longrun eect. That being said, structurally identifying the specic channels through which tax hikes
on the rich aect the economy both short and long term will better clarify the policy implications
of this study's ndings. A natural extension would be to dissect those channels.
13

This type of priors essentially adjusts the precision of a given coecient's prior distribution based on how weak

the eects are believed to be. Because longer lags are believed to have weaker eects than shorter lags, the prior's
variance decreases with the lag length.

For example, the distribution of lag 10's prior will be more concentrated

around zero compared to that of lag 1 or 2. Detailed discussions of the Minnesota priors as well as other types of
priors are provided in Koop and Korobilis (2010) and Lutkepohl (2007).
14

A Bayesian VAR is also estimated based purely on Minnesota priors (without special treatment of yearly taxshare

lags) and the results are very similar.

73

Table 3.3: Using Alternative Threshold Denitions of Rich

VARIABLES

Lagged Taxshare Top

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Empl.

Empl.

Empl.

Empl.

0.0508*

0.1%
(0.0303)
Lagged Taxshare Top

0.00945

0.5%
(0.0244)
Lagged Taxshare Top 1%

0.0497**
(0.0231)

Lagged Taxshare Top 5%

0.0512**
(0.0219)

Lagged Unemployment

-0.0565**

-0.0478**

-0.0509**

-0.0522**

(0.0229)

(0.0214)

(0.0205)

(0.0207)

0.496***

0.497***

0.497***

0.496***

(0.0367)

(0.0361)

(0.0366)

(0.0363)

0.0615

0.0543

0.0721

0.0666

(0.0550)

(0.0538)

(0.0567)

(0.0555)

0.00844***

0.00850***

0.00472

0.00490*

(0.00216)

(0.00302)

(0.00296)

(0.00273)

0.330**

0.276**

0.299**

0.305**

(0.136)

(0.125)

(0.122)

(0.121)

Rate

GDP Growth

Lagged Average Tax Rate
All

Lagged RIG

Constant

Observations
Adjusted

R2

244

244

244

244

0.566

0.562

0.570

0.572

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes. See notes Table 3.2.

74

Table 3.4: The Eects of Increasing the Tax Share of Other Income Groups

VARIABLES

Lagged Taxshare Top

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Empl.

Empl.

Empl.

Empl.

Empl.

Empl.

0.0667***

Quintile
(0.0247)
Lagged Taxshare 4th

-0.0875***

Quintile
(0.0263)
Lagged Taxshare 3rd

0.00309

Quintile
(0.0585)
Lagged Taxshare 2nd

-0.0144

Quintile
(0.101)
Lagged Taxshare Bottom

0.130

Quintile
(0.491)
Lagged Taxshare Bottom

-0.0568

50%
(0.0577)
Lagged Unemployment

-0.0525***

-0.0525***

-0.0470**

-0.0469**

-0.0434*

-0.0490**

Rate

GDP Growth

Lagged Average Tax Rate

(0.0201)

(0.0191)

(0.0216)

(0.0207)

(0.0245)

(0.0212)

0.491***

0.485***

0.497***

0.496***

0.509***

0.491***

(0.0369)

(0.0370)

(0.0366)

(0.0360)

(0.0474)

(0.0370)

0.0797

0.0421

0.0486

0.0515

0.139**

0.0606

All

Lagged RIG

Constant

Observations
Adjusted

R

2

(0.0586)

(0.0539)

(0.0559)

(0.0552)

(0.0612)

(0.0582)

0.00626***

0.00794***

0.00938***

0.00919***

0.00491*

0.00851***

(0.00230)

(0.00205)

(0.00245)

(0.00229)

(0.00277)

(0.00225)

0.298**

0.310***

0.271**

0.270**

0.277*

0.282**

(0.120)

(0.114)

(0.123)

(0.120)

(0.143)

(0.124)

244

244

244

244

176

244

0.584

0.562

0.562

0.561

0.565

0.578

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes. See notes Table 3.2.
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Table 3.5: Short- Versus Long-Run Eects
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

VARIABLES

Empl.

Empl.

Empl.

Empl.

Taxshare Top 1%

-0.0382

0.0154

(0.0316)

(0.0203)

L Taxshare Top 1%
L2 Taxshare Top 1%
L3 Taxshare Top 1%
L4 Taxshare Top 1%

0.0586

0.0258

(0.0463)

(0.0365)

0.0168

0.0168

(0.0442)

(0.0439)

0.0135

0.0134

(0.0438)

(0.0436)

0.0131

0.0350

0.0847***

0.0838***

(0.0498)

(0.0467)

(0.0195)

(0.0195)

L5 Taxshare Top 1%

0.0755

0.0584

(0.0465)

(0.0442)

L6 Taxshare Top 1%

-0.0343

-0.0345

(0.0399)

(0.0400)

L7 Taxshare Top 1%

0.00195

0.00173

(0.0426)

(0.0427)

L8 Taxshare Top 1%

0.0248

0.0383

0.0434***

0.0441***

(0.0483)

(0.0473)

(0.0149)

(0.0145)

L9 Taxshare Top 1%

0.0577

0.0451

(0.0484)

(0.0476)

L10 Taxshare Top 1%

-0.0487

-0.0490

(0.0455)

(0.0454)

L11 Taxshare Top 1%

-0.0145

-0.0146

(0.0415)

(0.0415)

L12 Taxshare Top 1%

0.00201

0.0155

-0.0388**

-0.0391**

(0.0442)

(0.0435)

(0.0167)

(0.0164)

L13 Taxshare Top 1%

0.000926

-0.0118

(0.0454)

(0.0449)

L14 Taxshare Top 1%

-0.0185

-0.0187

(0.0441)

(0.0440)

L15 Taxshare Top 1%

-0.0527

-0.0528

(0.0412)

(0.0412)

L16 Taxshare Top 1%

-0.00711

-0.00546

-0.0554***

-0.0534***

(0.0285)

(0.0285)

(0.0160)

(0.0155)

-0.0657***

-0.0688***

-0.0625***

-0.0591***

Lagged Unemployment
Rate
Lagged RIG
Lagged Average Tax Rate

(0.0188)

(0.0185)

(0.0188)

(0.0183)

-0.00119

-0.00180

-0.00105

-0.000360

(0.00256)

(0.00264)

(0.00258)

(0.00261)

0.0580

0.0733

0.0609

0.0442

All
(0.0463)

(0.0451)

(0.0479)

(0.0438)

GDP growth

0.430***

0.429***

0.445***

0.448***

(0.0303)

(0.0303)

(0.0324)

(0.0316)

Constant

0.464***

0.483***

0.434***

0.412***

(0.111)

(0.109)

(0.114)

(0.110)

Observations
2
Adjusted R

232

232

232

232

0.626

0.625

0.616

0.617

Robust standard errors in parentheses
Notes. See notes Table 3.2.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 3.2: Romer and Romer (2010)'s Narrative Analysis of Tax Changes
Source: Romer and Romer (2010)
Notes. Panel A. shows all legislated tax changes from 1945Q1 to 2005Q4. Panel B. shows only tax changes classied

as  endogenous according to Romer and Romer's narrative record analysis. The period from 1977Q1 to 2000Q4 has
almost no  endogenous changes.
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Table 3.6: Using Romer and Romer's Exogenous Tax Change Period

VARIABLES

Lagged Taxshare Top

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Empl.

Empl.

Empl.

Empl.

0.0977***

0.1%
(0.0276)
Lagged Taxshare Top

0.0601***

0.5%
(0.0209)
Lagged Taxshare Top 1%

0.0868***
(0.0235)

Lagged Taxshare Top 5%

0.0672***
(0.0225)

Lagged Unemployment

-0.0708***

-0.0400*

-0.0507**

-0.0497**

(0.0249)

(0.0234)

(0.0222)

(0.0235)

0.381***

0.380***

0.359***

0.383***

(0.0378)

(0.0385)

(0.0398)

(0.0375)

-0.0646

-0.0158

-0.0316

-0.0202

Rate

GDP Growth

Lagged Average Tax Rate
All

Lagged RIG

Constant

Observations
Adjusted

R

2

(0.0731)

(0.0672)

(0.0694)

(0.0673)

-0.00531

-0.00643

-0.00703*

-0.00660

(0.00401)

(0.00414)

(0.00400)

(0.00406)

0.657***

0.448***

0.514***

0.491***

(0.152)

(0.146)

(0.141)

(0.146)

96

96

96

96

0.543

0.527

0.558

0.529

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes. The sample is restricted to the Romer and Romer's exogenous tax change period (from 1977Q1 to 2000Q4.)
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Table 3.7: Short Versus Long Run Using Romer and Romer's Exogenous Tax Change Period

VARIABLES

(1)

(2)

(3)

Empl.

Empl.

Empl.

Taxshare Top 1%

-0.0201
(0.0208)

L4 Taxshare Top 1%

0.0868***

0.116***

0.117***

(0.0235)

(0.0244)

(0.0246)

0.112***

0.106***

L8 Taxshare Top 1%

(0.0289)

(0.0274)

L12 Taxshare Top 1%

-0.0328

-0.0359

(0.0262)

(0.0261)

L16 Taxshare Top 1%

-0.0307

-0.0388

Lagged Unempl. Rate
GDP growth
Lagged Average Tax

(0.0242)

(0.0237)

-0.0507**

-0.0322

-0.0382

(0.0222)

(0.0270)

(0.0269)

0.359***

0.306***

0.305***

(0.0398)

(0.0363)

(0.0361)

-0.0316

-0.0396

-0.0306

(0.0694)

(0.0751)

(0.0718)

-0.00703*

-0.00825**

-0.00781*

(0.00400)

(0.00401)

(0.00407)

0.514***

0.391*

0.422**

(0.141)

(0.206)

(0.205)

Rate All
Lagged RIG
Constant

Observations
Adjusted

R2

96

96

96

0.558

0.668

0.669

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes. The sample is restricted to the Romer and Romer's exogenous tax change period (from 1977Q1 to 2000Q4.)
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Table 3.8: What Matters: the Rich Paying more or Others Paying Less?

(1)
Empl.

VARIABLES
Lagged Tax Change Top 1%
Lagged Tax Change Bottom
99%
Lagged Tax Change Top 5%

(2)
Empl.

(3)
Empl.

(4)
Empl.

0.0158*** 0.0135***
(0.00454)

(0.00407)

(0.00740)

(0.00416)

0.00604

-0.00251

0.0220*** 0.0165***
(0.00721)

Lagged Tax Change Bottom
95%

0.000363
(0.00612)

(0.00451)

-0.0461**

GDP Growth

0.502***

0.499***

0.506***

0.503***

(0.0345)

(0.0354)

(0.0339)

(0.0351)

Lagged Average Tax Rate All

-0.130

(0.113)

Lagged RIG
Constant

(0.0209)

-0.144

(0.114)

-0.0465**
(0.0210)

0.00337

0.00336

0.00337

0.00380

(0.00273)

(0.00274)

(0.00280)

(0.00277)

(0.149)

(0.135)

(0.150)

(0.136)

244
0.587

244
0.585

244
0.583

244
0.580

0.111

Observations
Adjusted R2

(0.0204)

-0.0463**

-0.00637

Lagged Unemployment Rate

(0.0204)

-0.0464**

(0.00575)

0.193

0.106

0.196

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes. See notes Table 3.2. The Tax Change variable for each income group measures the percentage change in tax

liability for that group over a year. The rst two columns feature Top 1 percent versus Bottom 99 percent while the
last two columns feature Top 5 percent versus Bottom 95 percent. In Columns 1 and 3, the overall average tax rate
constant is held constant as in the baseline specication to capture re-distributional eects only. In Columns 2 and
4, the overall average tax rate variable is removed to allow cases where tax hikes for some groups are not necessarily
associated with tax cuts for other groups.
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Table 3.9: What Matters: the Rich Paying more or Others Paying Less? (Alternative Specication)

(1)
Empl.

VARIABLES

(2)
Empl.

(3)
Empl.

(4)
Empl.

Lagged Tax Change Top 0.0157***
1%
(0.00444)

Lagged Tax Change
Bottom 99%

0.00573
(0.00744)

Lagged Tax Change Top
5%

(0.00727)

Lagged Tax Change
Bottom 95%
Lagged Unemployment
Rate

-0.0489**

GDP Growth

0.499***

Lagged Average Tax
Rate All
Lagged RIG
Constant
Observations
Adjusted R2

0.0220***

-0.0445**

(0.0194)

(0.0221)

(0.0359)

-0.0689

(0.0646)

-0.0465**
(0.0200)

0.00273
(0.00635)

-0.0456**
(0.0219)

0.500***

0.506***

0.498***

(0.0348)

(0.0345)

(0.0353)

-0.00784

-0.140*

0.0225

0.00294

0.00974***

(0.102)

(0.0841)

0.00333

0.00960***

(0.00266)

(0.00227)

(0.00271)

(0.00232)

(0.115)

(0.151)

(0.127)

(0.145)

244
0.588

244
0.563

244
0.584

244
0.562

0.173

0.213

0.109

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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(0.0935)

0.242*

Table 3.10: Using Average Tax Rate Instead of Tax Share
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

VARIABLES

Empl.

Empl.

Empl.

Empl.

Lagged Average Tax Rate Top 1%

0.0478

0.0475**

0.0514**

0.108***

(0.0310)
Lagged Unemployment Rate

GDP Growth

(0.0213)

(0.0219)

(0.0375)

-0.0516***

-0.0460**

-0.0570***

(0.0171)

(0.0194)

(0.0193)

0.499***

0.493***

0.483***

(0.0359)

(0.0351)

(0.0367)

Lagged Average Tax Rate All

-0.151*
(0.0780)

Lagged RIG

Constant

Observations
Adjusted

R

2

0.0103***

0.0126***

(0.00214)

(0.00240)

0.436***

0.336***

0.278**

0.356***

(0.0415)

(0.102)

(0.110)

(0.112)

256

256

244

244

0.009

0.534

0.576

0.582

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Response to Generalized One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
A. Response of Empl. to Empl.

B. Response of Empl. to Taxshare
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Figure 3.3: Unrestricted VAR, All Lags
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Table 3.11: Using Annual Data

VARIABLES

(1)

(2)

Employment

Employment

L Taxshare Top 1%

0.209**
(0.0973)

L2 Taxshare Top 1%

0.207***
(0.0663)

L3 Taxshare Top 1%

0.00720
(0.0578)

L4 Taxshare Top 1%

-0.196**
(0.0764)

L Taxshare Top 1%

0.184**
(0.0765)

L2 Taxshare Top 5%

0.186***
(0.0670)

L3 Taxshare Top 5%

0.0415
(0.0537)

L4 Taxshare Top 5%

-0.210***
(0.0768)

Lagged Unemployment

-0.0727

-0.0517

(0.0786)

(0.0830)

0.694***

0.675***

(0.223)

(0.206)

Rate

Lagged Average Tax Rate
All

Lagged RIG

GDP Growth

Constant

Observations
Adjusted

R2

-0.0130

-0.0107

(0.0105)

(0.00995)

0.714***

0.748***

(0.0649)

(0.0528)

-0.104

-0.342

(0.514)

(0.492)

58

58

0.801

0.814

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes. Data are annual from 1947 to 2011)
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Table 3.12: VAR Granger Causality Test
VAR Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests
Sample: 1947Q1 2011Q4
Included observations: 240

Dependent variable: Empl.
Excluded

Chi-sq

df

Prob.

Taxshare Top 1%

23.01492

5

0.0003

All

23.01492

5

0.0003

Excluded

Chi-sq

df

Prob.

Employment growth

2.869308

5

0.7201

All

2.869308

5

0.7201

Dependent variable: Taxshare

Response to Generalized One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
A. Response of Empl. to Empl.

B. Response of Empl. to Taxshare
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Figure 3.4: Unrestricted VAR, Select Lags
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(b) Panel B. Accumulated Response

Figure 3.5: IRF and Accumulated Impulse Response
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Figure 3.6: Bayesian VAR
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A. Chapter 1 appendices

A1. Data
The Ivorian macroeconomic time series are obtained from the World Bank's World Development
Indicators (WDI) database. The observations are annual and cover the period from 1960 to 2010.
All series except the trade balance-to-output ratio are log-transformations of per capita values.

Output:

GDP

Consumption:

Final consumption expenditure

Private Investment:
Public Investment:
Foreign Aid:
TBY

Gross xed capital formation, Private sector

Gross xed capital formation, Public sector

Net ocial development assistance (ODA) and ocial aid received

(Trade balance-to-output ratio): External balance on goods and services

Table A.1: Summary statistics
Obs.

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

49

6.27

0.22

5.9

6.74

Investment

49

4.85

0.65

3.97

6.14

Private Investment

45

4.31

0.68

3.37

5.54

Public Investment

45

3.85

0.78

2.56

5.34

GDP

49

6.57

0.19

6.34

7

Foreign aid

49

3.02

0.74

1.16

4.72

TBY ratio

49

0.06

0.05

-0.07

0.17

Consumption
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A2. Prior specications
Table A.2: Prior Distributions
Parameter

Dist.

p1

p2

95% prob. Interval

ρz
ρa
ρι
σz
σa
σι

beta

0.75

0.15

0.46

0.95

beta

0.75

0.15

0.46

0.95

beta

0.75

0.15

0.46

0.95

Inv.-gamma

0.5

4

0.002

10.05

Inv.-gamma

0.5

4

0.002

10.05

Inv.-gamma

0.5

4

0.002

10.05

A3. Estimation results: PDFs of priors and posteriors

Figure A.1: Estimation Results: Prior and Posterior Distibutions
Notes : The dierent panels show the estimated posterior distributions (in black) for each parameter. The top panels

are the AR(1) coecients.

The bottom panels are the standard deviations of the exogenous shocks.

The prior

distributions (in grey) are reported for reference. The green lines indicates the mode of the posterior distributions
calculated numerically. All the posteriors have a normal shape and the numerical (green) mode do coincide with the
peak of the posteriors for all the estimates.
Estimations are based on ve independent runs of Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) Metropolis-Hasting simulations with 100,000 draws each, from which the rst halves were discarded. The Brooks and Gelman 1989 statistics
are shown in Appendix A4 below.
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A4. Brooks and Gelman 1989 statistics

(a) Panel A

(b) Panel B

Figure A.2: Brooks and Gelman 1989 Statistics
Notes :

Panel A shows the statistics for the AR(1) coecients and Panel B shows the statistics for the standard

deviations of the exogenous shocks. Estimations are based on ve independent runs of Markov Chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) Metropolis-Hasting simulations. The red lines are estimates of the variance within chains. The blue lines
are estimates of the sum of the variances within and between chains. For each parameter, the red lines are stabilized
and the gaps between the two lines are closed, indicating convergence was obtained.
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B. Chapter 2 appendices

B1. Solving the household problem
max E

∞
X

β t U (Ct , Lt )

t=0
subject to:

Dt = (1 + Rt−1 ) Dt−1 + Ct + (1 − µt ) It + Φ (Kt − Kt−1 ) − (1 − τLt ) Wt Lt − (1 − τKt ) St Kt−1 − Tt



∗

Rt = R + p

Dt
Yt



Kt = (1 − δ) Kt−1 + It
First order conditions:

L =E

∞
X

β

t






U ((Ct , Lt ) − λt −Dt + 1 + Rt−1 Dt−1 + Ct + (1 − µt ) It + Φ Kt − Kt−1 − (1 − τLt ) Wt Lt − (1 − τKt ) St Kt−1 − Tt

t=o

∂L
= UC (Ct , Lt ) − λt = 0
∂Ct

UC (Ct , Lt ) = λt

∂L
= UL (Ct , Lt ) + λt (1 − τLt ) Wt = 0
∂Lt

UL (Ct , Lt ) = −λt (1 − τLt ) Wt
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∂L
= β t λt − β t+1 (1 + Rt )Et λt+1 = 0
∂Dt

λt = β(1 + Rt )Et λt+1
∂L
∂Kt

h
i
h


i

0
t+1
0
t
λt+1 − 1 − µt+1 (1 − δ) − Φ Kt+1 − Kt − 1 − τKt+1 St+1 = 0
= −β λt (1 − µt ) + Φ Kt − Kt−1 − Et β





λt (1 − µt ) + Φ0 (Kt − Kt−1 ) = βEt λt+1 (1 − µt+1 ) (1 − δ) + Φ0 (Kt+1 − Kt ) + (1 − τKt+1 ) St+1

B2. Steady state solutions
The Functional forms

1−γ
C − ω −1 Lω
−1
U (C, L) =
1−γ

Φ (x) = 1/2φx2 ;

φ>0



p (D) = ψ eD−D̄ − 1

F (K, L) = K α L1−α

Interest Rate R

The steady state risk premium is nil.

R = R∗

Capital to Output ratio

K
Y

Use the Euler equation from

to output ratio.

(1 − µ) = β [(1 − τK ) ZFK + (1 − µ) (1 − δ)]
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∂L
∂Kt and rearrange to get the capital

Y
K

= (1 − µ)

1
−(1−δ)
β

α(1−τK )

K
α (1 − τK )
i
h
=
1
Y
(1 − µ) β − (1 − δ)

Output to Labor ratio YL

Combine the marginal utility equations (from consumption and labor)

and the marginal product of labor equation to get the labor market equilibrium condition. Rearrange
to get the output to labor ratio.

− UUCL = (1 − τL ) W = (1 − τL ) ZFL
Y
L

=

Lω−1
(1−α)(1−τL )

Capital to Labor ratio
K
L

=

K
L

K
L

=

KY
Y L

α(1−τK )h
i Lω−1
(1−α)(1−µ)(1−τL ) β1 −(1−δ)

Labor

L

Use the output to labor and capital to labor ratios to derive a closed-form solution for

steady-state labor.

Y = ZK α L1−α

K α
Y
L =Z L




L = (1 − α) (1 − τL ) Z 

α 

α (1 − τK )
h
i 
(1 − α) (1 − µ) (1 − τL ) β1 − (1 − δ)

Other variables


Output:

Y =

1
ω
(1−α)(1−τL ) L



Capital:

K=

α(1−τK )h
i Lω
(1−α)(1−µ)(1−τL ) β1 −(1−δ)



Investment:



Wage:



Capital rental rate:



Lump sum tax:

I = δK

W = Z (1 − α) K α L−α
S = ZαK α−1 L1−α

T = τL W L + τK SK − µI
100

1
(ω−1)(1−α)



Debt:



Consumption:



Lambda:



Productivity:



Investment subsidy rate:



Trade Balance:



Current Account:

D=

D
Y Y

C = (1 − τL ) W L + (1 − τK ) SK + T − RD − (1 − µ) I

λ = C − ω −1 Lω

−γ

Z=1
µ = µ̄

TB = Y − C − I
CA = T B − RD
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C. Chapter 3 Appendices

Steps to construct the taxshare and averagetaxrate series from SOI data

The share and

average series are constructed using the Statistics of Income's (SOI) individual income tax data
from 1913 to 2011. One important note about the SOI data is that current dollar amounts, instead
of percentiles, dene pre-tax income brackets. Because of issues related to comparing those gures
across time (including ination, existence of trend in income growth, and change in scal denition
of income.), using a dollar denition of rich for a time-series based analysis is problematic. Even
after adjusting for ination, a dollar-based denition of income would still be inconsistent over
time. For example, saying all individuals with income over 1 million ination-adjusted dollars are
considered rich would lead to a situation in which a growing group of rich would develop over time
because of the national average income's positive trend. Consequently, the tax share of the rich,
considering the dollar-based denition, - would inherit a positive trend for no policy-related reason.
To obtain a consistent denition of rich in this study's time series, the dollar brackets of the SOIs
are converted into percentiles. Based on the SOI data there are three steps to obtain the taxshare
and averagetaxrate series.

Step1:

For each income group (for example, $10,000 to $25,000), the following information was col-

lected from the annual SOIs: number of returns, pre-tax income (taxable income or Adjusted

15 16

Gross Income (AGI)), and tax liability.

Step2:

The income group distributions (for example $10,000 to $25,000) were converted to the

following percentile groups: bottom 50%; all ve quintiles; top 10, 5, 1, 0.5, and 0.1 percentiles.
Because mapping dollar income groups to percentiles is virtually impossible, interpolation is
used between some income groups. Using interpolation may lead to less accurate percentile
measures at the bottom of the distribution, given the density of low-income dollar groups.
15

Data from 1913 to 1949 are from the 1949 SOI, which has historical tables by income group for this period.

Similarly, data from 1950 to 1959 are from the 1959 SOI; and data from 1960 to 1969 are from 1969 SOI. From 1970
to 1980, individual SOIs are used. And from 1980 to 2011, SOIs tax liability by income group for 1980 to 2011 is
available for download from the IRS's website.
16

The measure of pre-tax income reported is not the same across all SOIs. Before 1944, the measure reported is

taxable income, i.e., gross income minus deductions. Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) is used for 1944 and after.
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17

However, the top-income groups, which are this study's focus, suer less from this problem.

18

Step3:

17

The following variables of interest are computed for each year



taxshare for percentile group



averagetaxrate for percentile group

i

= Tax liability group

i

i

t:

/ Total tax liability all taxpayers

= Tax liability group

i

/ Income group

i

For some years, the SOI has a  No positive income category for which the total income is sometime negative

(possibly due to business losses or deductions exceeding income). When distributions are computed, they are treated
as zero income instead of negative income to be consistent with other years when these categories are not reported.
When applicable, taxes reported for this category are insignicant and discarded. Alternatively, they could be added
to the left tail, but the impact on the distributions remains trivial.
18

For the period from 1950 to 1969, the distribution reported in the SOIs is only for taxable returns. The non-

taxable returns are added to the no income category. This addition aects the tax burden distribution's accuracy at
the very left tail (bottom quintile) but should not aect the other categories. Again, this study is more concerned
with the right tail's accuracy.
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Table C.1: Transmission Mechanisms: Eects on GDP Components
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Empl.

Cons.

Invt.

Invt.

Exports

0.0838***

0.0542*

0.339**

0.242

0.276*

(0.0195)

(0.0293)

(0.161)

(0.158)

(0.141)

L8S4.taxsharetop1pct

0.0441***

-0.0368

-0.136

-0.0701

0.0228

(0.0145)

(0.0255)

(0.127)

(0.116)

(0.138)

L12S4.taxsharetop1pct

-0.0391**

-0.0899***

-0.514***

-0.353***

-0.188

(0.0164)

(0.0248)

(0.124)

(0.122)

(0.171)

L16S4.taxsharetop1pct

-0.0534***

0.0123

-0.0365

-0.0585

-0.0859

(0.0155)

(0.0271)

(0.135)

(0.122)

(0.140)

-0.0591***

-0.000174

0.375**

0.376**

-0.0398

(0.0183)

(0.0286)

(0.172)

(0.170)

(0.179)

VARIABLES

Lagged taxshare Top 1%

Lagged Unemployment
Rate

GDP Growth

0.448***
(0.0316)

Lagged Average Tax Rate

0.0442

All
(0.0438)
Lagged RIG

-0.000360
(0.00261)

consumptiongrowth

1.788***
(0.381)

Constant

Observations
Adjusted

R2

0.412***

0.844***

-1.165

-2.674***

1.683

(0.110)

(0.181)

(1.002)

(1.026)

(1.207)

232

244

244

244

244

0.617

0.048

0.080

0.167

0.004

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes. Data are quarterly from 1947Q1 to 2011Q4.
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Response to Generalized One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
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Figure C.1: Three Variable VAR
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University's School of International and Public Aairs. After graduating from Columbia University
with a masters in economic policy management in 2009, he joined the Department of Economics
at the University of Tennessee in Knoxville, where he obtained his PhD in Economics in 2014.
Ahiteme's research focuses on development and scal policy issues, particularly in the context of
small open economies. In August 2014, he will be joining the Department of Business and Social
Entrepreneurship at Rollins College in Winter Park, Florida, where he has accepted a position as
Assistant Professor of Economics.
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